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“I think that condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary in 
accordance with procedural ‘due process of law.’  To farm out this 
responsibility to the police and prosecuting attorneys is a judicial 
abdication in which I will have no part.”1 
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 1. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Black warned in 1952 about the dangers of giving immigration 
police and prosecutors the authority to jail human beings with very little 
involvement by the judiciary.  Today’s immigration detention machine 
illustrates Justice Black’s fears: U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) agents have both arrested 182,869 people in a single year2 and 
decided whether those individuals will be released or remain incarcerated for 
the remainder of their removal proceedings.  For those entitled to 
immigration judge review, the judge works for the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) under the supervision of the Attorney General, the nation’s top 
prosecutor.3  Immigration judges’ lack of independence has long been a 
subject of critique,4 leading some to refer to themselves as “‘U.S. imitation 
 
 2. U.S. IMMGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 
OPERATIONS REPORT 7, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/eroReport 
FY2020.pdf; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 
OPERATIONS REPORT 5 https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/ 
eroReportFY2019.pdf (reporting that DHS agents arrested 510,854 people in fiscal year 2019). 
 3. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart (last 
visited May 2, 2021); About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office 
(last visited May 2, 2021). 
 4. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The Fourth Amendment Implications of “U.S. Imitation Judges”, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2020); Joint Letter from Am. Bar Ass’n, Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n, 
Fed. Bar Ass’n, and Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges to Congress (July 11, 2019), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/7-11-joint-letter-1.pdf [hereinafter Joint Letter] (calling on 
Congress to “establish an immigration court system that is independent of the U.S. Department of 
Justice”); Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 
707, 760–76 (2019); Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of 
“Courts”, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 309 (2019); TESS HELLGREN, ET AL., INNOVATION L. LAB & 
S. POVERTY L. CTR., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS 
BECAME A DEPORTATION TOOL (June 2019), https://innovationlawlab.org/media/ 
COM_PolicyReport_The-Attorney-Generals-Judges_FINAL.pdf; Strengthening and Reforming 
America’s Immigration Court System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigr. of 
the S. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. 7 (2018) (statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Immigr. Judges), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-18-
18%20Tabaddor%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Tabaddor]; Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin & Hon. 
Dana Leigh Marks, Conflicting Roles of Immigration Judges: Do You Want Your Case Heard by a 
“Government Attorney” or by a “Judge”?, 16 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1785, 1788–90 (2011); 
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N IMMIGR., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_co
mplete_full_report.pdf; Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 1635, 1644 (2010); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an 
Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3–4, 10–11 (2008); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 369–70 (2006); 
Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate 
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGR. 
REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 175–83 (1997), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED424310.pdf [hereinafter BECOMING AN AMERICAN]; Peter J. 
Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644, 
645–47 (1981); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN 
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judges.’”5  In sum, when the DHS police arrest a person, only a prosecutor 
reviews that decision.  Most of these crucial decisions about a person’s liberty 
occur without any review by an Article III judge.  
In this Article, I propose that Congress, in recognition that immigration 
detention is punishment, strip imitation judges of their authority to review 
decisions about physical liberty.  Such decisions should only be entrusted to 
a federal magistrate judge, with review by an Article III judge.  The 
procedures are already in place elsewhere; Congress need look no further 
than the Bail Reform Act, which applies when a person is held while awaiting 
a criminal trial.6  Federal courts have borrowed heavily from criminal pretrial 
detention procedures, engaging in piecemeal oversight of the immigration 
detention system through habeas corpus review.  I argue that these decisions 
reflect lower federal courts’ persistence in monitoring the rights of 
immigration detainees, even in the face of legislation that has aimed to limit 
the judiciary’s role.7  Yet such review has happened for only a subset of 
detainees—those who are savvy enough to file a habeas corpus petition and 
lucky enough (or rich enough) to have habeas counsel, and those for whom 
the federal court reaches the merits of the custody challenge before the 
deportation case concludes (which moots the petition).8  The work of these 
lower federal courts has been laudable, but a better solution that reaches every 
immigration detainee is necessary.   
Now is the right moment to address this critical issue. The Biden 
administration should focus on reforming both our broken immigration 
detention and immigration adjudication systems.9  Immigration detention 
reached an all-time high during the Trump administration, with a daily 
population reaching over 55,000, many being warehoused by the private 
 
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7 (1980); SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGR.  & REFUGEE POL’Y, 96TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS (Joint Comm. Print 1980). 
 5. Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin & Hon. Dorothy Harbeck, A View from the Bench by the 
National Association of Immigration Judges, FED. LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2016, at 70 (“As one of our 
colleagues put it, we often feel that we are ‘U.S. imitation judges.’”). 
 6. See infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III.D. 
 9. See Paul Wickham Schmidt, From the Heights of Kasinga to the Depths of America’s 
Deadly Star Chambers: Will the Biden Administration Tap the New Due Process Army to Fix EOIR 
& Save Our Nation? IMMIGRATION COURTSIDE (Nov. 12, 2020), https://immigrationcourtside.com/ 
2020/11/12/from-the-heights-of-kasinga-to-the-depths-of-americas-deadly-star-chambers-will-the-
biden-administration-tap-the-new-due-process-army-to-fix-eoir-save-our-nation/; T. ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF & DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD., THE NEW SCH. & ZOLBERG INST. 
ON MIGRATION & MOBILITY, IMPROVING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF 
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 2020), https://cmsny.org/publications/immigration-
recommendations-biden/. 
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prison industry.10  The Trump administration ensured a rise in immigration 
arrests each year.11  The attorneys general of the Trump administration did 
significant work to strip immigration judges of their independence, building 
off similar work done by prior attorneys general.12  Two recent empirical 
studies of immigration judge decisions demonstrate that rates of denials of 
bond and relief from removal increased in the Trump administration, 
providing evidence that judges are not truly independent.13  Retired 
immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals members have 
critiqued the Trump administration for repeatedly undermining the 
independence of immigration judges.14  Four major national organizations—
the American Bar Association, the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the National Association of 
Immigration Judges—sent a joint letter to Congress in July 2019, asking for 
an independent immigration court,15 and Congress held such a hearing in 
January 2020.16 
This Article merges two themes from the existing scholarship: (1) 
immigration judges’ lack of independence and (2) lack of procedural rights 
for immigration detainees.  Scholars, lawyers, judges, and congressional 
committees have been recommending a more independent immigration 
adjudication system for decades.17  My proposal advocates for a change to a 
subset of immigration decisions, those involving physical custody.  Detention 
is different from other immigration decisions—scholars have argued that it 
 
 10. TRAC Immigration, ICE Detainees (2021), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
detentionstats/pop_agen_table.html ; Denise Gilman & Luis A. Romero, Immigration Detention, 
Inc., 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 145, 148 (2018).  
 11. Ron Nixon, Immigration Arrests and Deportations Are Rising, I.C.E. Data Show, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/illegal-immigrant-arrests-
deportations-rise.html. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, 69 DUKE 
L.J. 1855, 1855–56 (2020); Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political 
Control Over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 585 (2020). 
 14. Paul Wickham Schmidt, Barr Continues Restrictionist Assault on Immigration Courts: 
Intends to Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & Credit” to State Court Sentence 
Modifications—Another Disingenuous Request For “Amicus Briefing!”, (May 30, 2019), 
https://immigrationcourtside.com/2019/05/30/barr-continues-restrictionist-assault-on-
immigration-courts-intends-to-reverse-bia-precedents-giving-full-faith-credit-to-state-court-
sentence-modifications-another-disi/; Jeffrey S. Chase, AILA Press Call: The Immigration Courts, 
OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (May 20, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/ 
5/20/aila-press-call-the-immigration-courts. 
 15. Joint Letter, supra note 4.  
 16. Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration 
Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship, 116th Cong. (2020), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2757.  
 17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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is punishment.18  Thus, imitation judges should have no role in these 
decisions.  Nor does the immigration judge have any particular expertise in 
determining danger and flight risk; rather, magistrate judges make these 
decisions for criminal defendants on a daily basis.19  I go further than others 
by proposing that the adjudicator not be an administrative law judge or even 
an Article I court, but a magistrate judge, whose decisions are subject to 
review by an Article III judge.  I and others have advocated for stronger 
procedural protections in immigration detention decisions, such as a 
government-borne burden of proof, a prompt probable cause hearing, court-
appointed counsel, and the requirement that judges determine alternatives to 
detention and a detainee’s ability to pay; with these procedures, immigration 
bond hearings can more closely track criminal pretrial detention hearings.20  
My proposal here differs in that it physically moves the procedures to an 
entirely different court.  Rather than importing procedural protections 
piecemeal into immigration court, with oversight by federal judges through 
habeas corpus, I propose a system where all decisions regarding physical 
custody are removed from immigration court and placed in federal district 
court.   
In Part I, I will describe how immigration judges are not truly 
independent, but are attorneys who work under the Attorney General and may 
suffer personal consequences for ruling against the enforcement priorities of 
the DOJ.21  This Part will discuss examples of how immigration judges’ 
independence suffers, particularly in detention decisions, because their 
 
 18. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014); DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY, 
POLITICS xxii–xxiii (2012). 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Promptly Proving the Need to Detain for Post-Entry Social Control 
Deportation, 52 VAL. U.L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2018); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration 
Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2141 (2017); Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The 
Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 157 (2016); 
Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 
76 (2016); Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 125, 168–69 (2015); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional 
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 161–62 (2013); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional 
Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending 
Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 63 (2012); Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness 
on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1519–22 (2012); Travis Silva, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of 
Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 229–30 (2012); Faiza W. Sayed, 
Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than “Enemy 
Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (2011); David Cole, 
Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 
719–22 (2009). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
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decisions can and have been unilaterally overruled by law enforcement 
actors.22  Thus, the current system’s lack of an independent judge undermines 
the legitimacy of immigration detention decisions.23  In Part II, I will outline 
the role that Article III courts have played in custody decisions in the modern 
era of immigration detention.24  Even when Congress attempted to take away 
Article III court oversight of custody decisions, the lower federal courts in 
particular have monitored the right to physical liberty for immigration 
detainees.25  In Part III, I will outline a proposal for reform, calling on 
Congress to remove all custody decisions from the DOJ and grant jurisdiction 
instead to Article III courts.26  I will conclude the article in Part IV.27 
I. THE LACK OF AN INDEPENDENT IMMIGRATION JUDGE 
In this section, I draw from scholarship and reports critiquing the 
immigration system as lacking an independent judge, to highlight why the 
involvement of Article III judges in immigration detention decisions is 
needed now more than ever.  I focus on examples where immigration judges’ 
independence has been undermined in immigration detention decisions.   
A. The Historically Commingled Functions and “War on 
Independence”  
The various federal agencies that have enforced immigration law 
throughout history have never truly separated prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions.28  The Supreme Court in 1950 held that the so-called “‘one-man’ 
hearing[],”29 with one person acting as both prosecutor and adjudicator in a 
deportation case, did not comport with the hearing requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).30  The APA requires these functions 
to be separate in order to bring trial-like procedures into administrative 
hearings.31  Yet Congress then exempted deportation hearings from the 
 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1307–13. 
 29. See Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
453–59 (1988), reprinted in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION 
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 686, 687–88 (6th ed. 2015). 
 30. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45–48 (1950). 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (stating that an adjudicatory officer shall not “be responsible to or subject 
to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative 
or prosecuting functions for an agency” and “[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance 
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APA,32 which caused the Supreme Court to later permit a “two-man” hearing 
where the prosecutor and adjudicator worked together in the same agency.33   
Eventually the judges broke away from the prosecutors, starting to wear 
robes in 1973 and graduating to the title of immigration judge instead of 
“special inquiry officer.”34  Starting in 1983, immigration prosecutors and 
judges took up residence in different agencies within the DOJ.35  The 
prosecutors continued to work for the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (“INS”), while the immigration judges and Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) started to work for the newly-created Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency of the DOJ.36  An 
empirical study of bond hearings conducted in the Chicago immigration court 
demonstrated an institutional culture of judges during this time period that 
valued their desire for enhanced stature and independence, “probably [to] 
encourage their independence from the INS.”37  
The immigration adjudication system established in 1983 persists to this 
day, with immigration judges in courts throughout the country making trial-
level decisions.38 Either the prosecutor or noncitizen can appeal an 
immigration judge’s decision to the Board, a single appellate body that sits 
in Virginia.39 The manner in which Board members make their decisions 
drastically changed in 2002. While Board members typically decided cases 
by three-member panels issuing written decisions, Attorney General Ashcroft 
 
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually 
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency 
review . . . except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.”).  The APA language regarding 
separation of functions is largely the same as when the APA first was enacted in 1946.  See Wong 
Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 35 n.1 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1946)).  
 32. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306–307 (1955). 
 33. Rawitz, supra note 29, at 687–88; see also Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306–10.  
 34. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Lecture at Cornell L. Sch., Berger Int’l Speaker Series: The 
Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/ 
blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi; Rawitz, supra note 29, at 688–89.  A 
Department of Justice policy in 1994 required robes to be worn during hearings.  Jain, supra note 
4, at 290. 
 35. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial Amendments, 48 
Fed. Reg. 8,056 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 0).  
 36. Id.  
 37. Janet A. Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 515, 524 (1988); see also Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of 
Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (1987) (providing more detailed findings from an 
empirical study of Chicago immigration courts’ bond redetermination practices).  
 38. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1641–42. Today, 
there are seventy-one separate immigration courts throughout the United States.  EOIR Immigration 
Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last 
updated May 11, 2021). 
 39. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1643. 
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announced procedural shortcuts in 2002 that allowed a single Board member 
to affirm an immigration judge’s decision without a written opinion.40 The 
immigration adjudication system also permits the Attorney General to act as 
an adjudicator, and thus decide certain precedent-setting cases that 
immigration judges and the Board are bound to follow.41  
Twenty years after the creation of EOIR, immigration prosecutors were 
moved to the newly-created DHS and no longer worked within the same 
agency as the adjudicators.42  Yet, a key component of the original blended 
functions remained—judges and the Board, the supposedly independent 
adjudicators, were supervised by the country’s top law enforcement officer, 
as they all worked for the DOJ.43  At this same time, the DOJ began what 
Stephen Legomsky has called a “war on independence” of the immigration 
adjudicators.44  Legomsky outlines three types of constraints that executive 
or legislative actors can impose on the authority of the adjudicator: (1) the 
substitution of a general rule for individualized adjudication or judgment; (2) 
a decision by an executive or administrative official to intervene in a pending 
case; and (3) a threat of personal consequences to adjudicators (including 
reassignment to a less desirable position, nonrenewal of appointment, or loss 
of compensation) if they do not reach a certain type of outcome.45   
In 2002, not long after the National Association of Immigration Judges 
(“NAIJ”) issued a proposal for an independent court, Attorney General 
Ashcroft published a final rule that reduced the size of the Board from 
twenty-three to eleven members.46  This caused Board members who ruled 
most frequently in favor of immigrants to be reassigned to non-adjudicative 
positions within the Department.47  The DOJ reminded critics of the move 
 
 40. Id. at 1657–58; see also Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 
4, at 375.  This change in the procedures used by the Board were accompanied by the other changes 
that impacted the Board, which this Article describes infra in notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 41. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).  This Article further discusses the Attorney General’s use of this 
authority to decide immigration precedential decisions in the detention context infra notes 84–143.  
 42. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).  
 43. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 4, at 3–4; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, 
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1024 (1998) (“The 
Attorney General . . . and other political appointees in the Justice Department are politically 
accountable for their success in creating the reality or appearance of border control, in general or in 
well-publicized cases.”). 
 44. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 370 (“I submit 
it is accurate to depict the sum of these various measures as an all-out war on the very notion of 
decisional independence in the adjudication of immigration cases.”). 
 45. Id. at 369–71.  In his article, Legomsky focuses on the third type of decisional 
independence.  Id. at 387–89. 
 46. Id. at 373–76. 
 47. Id. at 376 (citing Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence, supra note 4, at 
1164). 
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that “[e]ach Board member is a Department of Justice attorney who is 
appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney General.”48  
These reassignments marked the first time in the Board’s history that an 
Attorney General had removed a Board member.49  The 2002 final DOJ rule 
also identified a different degree of independence by the Board.50  Legomsky 
noted that although the reassignments impacted only Board members, “the 
reference to ‘[a]ll attorneys’ makes clear that the attorney general intended 
the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as well.”51  In the Trump 
administration, former Attorney General Sessions reminded immigration 
judges of their subservient role in carrying out the Trump administration’s 
priorities of having “zero illegal immigration in this country.”52  Sessions 
went so far as to remove one immigration judge from adjudicating several 
cases because of that judge’s lenience toward noncitizens.53   
In 2002, the DOJ also formally implemented “case completion goals” 
for the immigration adjudicators.54  Case completion goals often dictate a 
result that favors the government, and thus gives one party appearing before 
a supposedly “neutral” judge an unfair advantage.55  The DOJ did not 
publicly state that actions would be taken against individual judges for failure 
 
 48. Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2002)). 
 49. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 379. 
 50. Id.  Until 2002, a regulation stated that “Board members shall exercise their independent 
judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Board.”  Id. (quoting former 8 C.F.R. § 
3.1(a)(1) (2002)).  The new rule rearranged the priorities, stating that “Board members shall be 
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases 
that come before them.”  Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(a)(1), 3.1(d)(1)(ii) (2003)).  Only later does a 
“diluted version” of the decisional independence language appear.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) 
(2005) (“Subject to the governing standards . . . , Board members shall exercise their independent 
judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the Board . . . .”).  
 51. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1670 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003)). 
 52. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (2018) 
(quoting Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Legal Training Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018)).  In remarks during the EOIR’s Legal 
Training Program, Attorney General Sessions asserted, “‘all of us should agree that, by definition, 
we ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,’ and reminded immigration judges in 
attendance that they [must] “conduct designated proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall 
perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.’”  Id. (alteration in original). 
 53. Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Removed from Cases After Perceived Criticism of Sessions, 
CNN (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/immigration-judges-
justice-department-grievance/index.html.  
 54. Noonan Slavin & Marks, supra note 4, at 1787. 
 55. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1317–19; Chase, supra note 34 (“[J]ust to be clear, the quotas 
are not designed to have a neutral impact; the administration hopes that forcing more completions 
will also result in more denials.”). 
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to comply, yet a 2008 study concerning immigration judge burnout revealed 
a common perception of the mandatory nature of the case completion goals.56  
In the Trump administration, immigration judges’ fears became a reality, 
when Attorney General Sessions in 2018 proposed individual production 
quotas on immigration judges, instead of the former case completion goals 
that were imposed on each immigration court.57  A judge’s failure to complete 
a certain number of cases would impact the judge’s performance evaluation.58  
According to the President of the NAIJ, this “unprecedented 
move . . . violates every tenet of an independent court and judges,”59 as “the 
NAIJ is not aware of a single state or federal court across the country that 
imposes the type of production quotas and deadlines on judges like those that 
EOIR has now announced.”60  
In 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced a system of 
performance evaluations for each immigration judge and Board member.61  
In 2007, regulations went into effect that made explicit the legal authority to 
establish such a performance evaluation system—without any input or public 
disclosure of the procedures, and without criteria for determining what 
 
 56. See Noonan Slavin & Marks, supra note 4, at 1787–88; see also Stuart L. Lustig et al., 
Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National Association of Immigration 
Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 64–66 (2008) (quoting an immigration 
judge who stated “[w]hat is required . . . is quantity over quality”). 
 57. EOIR Performance Plan: Adjudicative Employees, CNN, http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/ 
2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf; Tal Kopan, Justice Department rolls out case 
quotas for immigration judges, CNN (Apr. 2, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html; Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7 (comparing 
former court-specific case completion goals with new quotas for individual judges). 
 58. Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7.  At the same time, Attorney General Sessions took other 
measures to ensure that fewer noncitizens could ultimately be granted relief by an immigration 
judge.  For one, he eliminated administrative closure, a measure that takes a noncitizen’s case off 
the docket of the immigration court while an application for relief is pending in another agency.  See 
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018).  He also instructed judges to be more 
stringent in their continuances, requiring them to factor in both “administrative efficiency” (case 
completion goals) and DHS objections when deciding whether to grant continuances.  See Matter 
of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 415–17 (A.G. 2018).  These two cases combined to ensure that 
those with applications for relief pending before another agency were more likely to be ordered 
deported before that application is decided.  
 59. Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7. 
 60. Id. at 8; see also Betsy Swan, New Quotas for Immigration Judges are ‘Incredibly 
Concerning,’ Critics Warn, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:58 PM),  https://www.thedailybeast.com 
/new-quotas-for-immigration-judges-are-a-recipe-for-disaster-critics-warn?ref=scroll. 
 61. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu 
of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 496 (2007) (citing Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for 
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html).  
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constitutes good “performance.”62  The newest rendition of the performance 
evaluation criteria includes both individual quotas for case completion and a 
limit on the number of reversals by the Board.63  Because the Board members 
left in place after the 2002 purge proved more likely to reverse an immigrant-
friendly decision, under the new performance metrics, an immigration judge 
who rules too often in favor of a noncitizen runs the risk of exceeding the 
limit on the number of Board reversals.64  Legomsky writes that the combined 
effect of the reassignments of Board members, adjusted “independence” 
regulations, and performance evaluations “remind surviving and future BIA 
members and immigration judges that they hold their jobs at the discretion of 
one of the opposing parties in the cases that come before them.”65   
In 2008, concern over the political hiring of immigration judges caused 
a congressional committee to examine these claims.  The DOJ’s former 
liaison to the White House, Monica Goodling, testified before the U.S. House 
Judiciary Committee that, from 2004 to 2006, the DOJ and White House 
appointed immigration judges based on their Republican Party affiliations or 
conservative political views, bypassing the usual procedures.66  Although 
these concerns righted themselves in response to this congressional inquiry,67 
the concerns reemerged when the Trump administration hired additional 
 
 62. Id. at 496 (citing Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,675 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240 (2007)); Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 5 (critiquing 
immigration judges’ performance reviews by comparing them to other judges’ reviews, where “the 
overwhelming majority of these reviews follow a judicial model—a transparent, public process 
where performance is evaluated by input from the stakeholders (attorneys, witnesses, and court 
staff) based on quality and temperament, not quantity, and is not tied to discipline.”). 
 63. EOIR Performance Plan, supra note 57. 
 64. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 376; Levinson, 
The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence, supra note 4, at 1164. 
 65. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1671. 
 66. Id. at 1665–66 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF PRO.’ RESP. & OFF. OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN.,’ AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 69–124 (2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/s0807/final.pdf.  The usual procedures 
involved an announcement of the vacancy, minimum requirements, and a statement that the DOJ 
does not discriminate on bases such as political affiliation.  Id. at 72.  The announcement also stated 
that applicants must fulfill three or more of five criteria: (1) knowledge of immigration laws and 
procedures; (2) substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume context; (3) experience 
handling complex legal issues; (4) experience conducting administrative hearings; and (5) 
knowledge of judicial practices and procedures.  Id.  EOIR Officials would then conduct an 
interview process conducted by the Chief Immigration Judge and Assistant Chief Immigration 
Judges, with a recommendation to the EOIR Director for the desired candidates.  Id.  
 67. See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1666 (discussing 
Attorney General’s 2007 “new immigration judge appointment process in which EOIR would once 
again play the dominant role”). 
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immigration judges to clear up the current case backlog.68  In this process, 
there were allegations that candidates were rejected “based on their perceived 
political or ideological views.”69  Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judge-
turned immigration court-watcher, blogged in March 2019 that “[a]t present, 
nearly all new IJ hires are former prosecutors or those who otherwise have 
been deemed to fit this administration’s ideological profile.”70  Chase’s views 
reflect an empirical reality that spans beyond the Trump administration; the 
past three administrations have disproportionately hired immigration judges 
with backgrounds as immigration prosecutors, instead of those who worked 
as defense counsel.71  
The Biden administration has followed the same well-worn path of 
hiring former immigration prosecutors as judges.  The first seventeen 
immigration judges the Biden administration hired were selected during the 
Trump administration and their immigration experience, if any, involved 
working for ICE.72  The hiring priorities for immigration judges stands in 
stark contrast to the administration’s selection process for Article III judges, 
which has prioritized hiring candidates from diverse professional 
backgrounds,73 including former public defenders.74 
What we see developing over the past two decades in the “war on 
independence” is a shift in the institutional culture of the agency housing 
immigration adjudicators.75  While immigration judges worked hard in the 
1970s and 80s to distance themselves from INS prosecutors,76 the DOJ reined 
the judges in, reminding them in various ways that they served at the pleasure 
 
 68. See Tom Dart, Jeff Sessions Accused of Political Bias in Hiring Immigration Judges, 
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/16/jeff-sessions-
political-bias-hiring-immigration-judges. 
 69. Id.; see also Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1689 
(“The tawdry hiring practices that so badly tarnished EOIR and other components of the Department 
of Justice have since been corrected, but without congressional action, nothing prevents future 
Justice Department and White House officials from lapsing.”) (citations omitted). 
 70. Chase, supra note 34.  
 71. Kim & Semet, Political Control Over Immigration Adjudication, supra note 13, at 612–16; 
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1666.  
 72. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Fills Immigration Court with Trump Hires, HILL (May 8, 2021), 
https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/552373-biden-fills-immigration-court-with-trump-
hires.  
 73. Madeleine Carlisle, Inside Joe Biden’s Plan to Confirm Diverse Federal Judges, TIME 
(May 11, 2021), https://time.com/6047501/joe-biden-federal-judges/.  
 74. On the Bench: Federal Judiciary; ACS’s Judicial News Roundup, AM. CONST. SOC’Y,  
(May 13, 2021), https://www.acslaw.org/judicial-nominations/on-the-bench/ (“[T]he White House 
put an emphasis on the professional and personal diversity of these nominees.  The White House 
particularly highlighted that several of the nominees had spent time as federal defenders.”). 
 75. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 369–70. 
 76. See Gilboy, Administrative Review, supra note 37, at 524. 
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of the Attorney General and that their jobs were threatened if their results 
were too immigrant-friendly.77  The DOJ has twice sought to decertify the 
immigration judges’ union, an effort to destroy a major voice advocating for 
the creation of an independent immigration court,  which saw success on the 
eve of the November 2020 election.78  
B. Undermining Immigration Judges’ Independence by Substituting a 
General Detention Rule for Individual Adjudication 
While the previous section describes how judges were made to believe 
they would suffer professional consequences for ruling against the 
government, this Section outlines examples of DOJ actors substituting a 
general rule for individual adjudication by judges, which presents another 
manner in which immigration judges’ independence is undermined.79  Each 
of these examples impacted immigration judges’ detention decisions.   
Immigration judges’ assertion of greater judicial independence in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s led to a high rate of judges lowering bonds set 
initially by the INS.80  INS officials viewed “immigration judges as pushy 
intruders whose demands in the name of due process only obstruct the [INS] 
 
 77. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 372; Jain, supra 
note 4, at 306. 
 78. See Richard Gonzales, Trump Administration Seeks Decertification of Immigration Judges’ 
Union, NPR (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/12/750656176/trump-
administration-seeks-decertification-of-immigration-judges-union.  On July 31, 2020, the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) rejected this attempt, refusing to revisit its 2000 decision that 
immigration judges were not “management officials” and therefore could unionize.  Decision and 
Order, Dep’t of Justice, EOIR and NAIJ, WA-RP-19-0067 (F.L.R.A. July 31, 2020).  The FLRA 
abruptly reversed course on November 2, 2020, in what the NAIJ has referred to as a “politically-
motivated decision.” Decision and Order, Dep’t of Justice, EOIR and NAIJ, WA-RP-19-0067 
(F.L.R.A. November 2, 2020); Letter from NAIJ to Att’y Gen. Merrick Garland (June 7, 2021), 
https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/Final%2B06072021%2BSign%2Bon%2 
BLetter%2B-%2BNAIJ%2BDOJ%2BWithdraw%2BFLRA%2BPetition.pdf. The NAIJ has sought 
reconsideration of the decision.  See Joe Davidson, For Judges, Biden’s Actions Are a Split 
Decision, WASH. POST (July 4, 2021, 4:17 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/for-judges-bidens-actions-are-a-split-decision/2021/07/04/3233f122-dce9-11eb-a501-
0e69b5d012e5_story.html.  
 79. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 387–88. 
 80. See Gilboy, Setting Bail, supra note 37, at 368–69 (reporting results of an empirical study 
of immigration judge bonds set during a period in 1983 by Chicago immigration judges—the busiest 
immigration court in the country at the time—where 95% who asked an immigration judge to review 
the INS bond got a lower bond, and no immigration judge increased the bond amount).  In a white 
paper to the INS regarding its detention strategies in 1997, Peter Schuck noted disparities between 
INS and immigration judge bonds, and recommended that the Deputy Attorney “adopt guidelines 
and policies designed to better coordinate bonding decisions and to impose departmental priorities 
and policies on EOIR as well as the INS.”  Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White 
Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 683–84 (1997). 
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mission.”81  INS’s General Counsel publicly stated that the agency’s 
regulatory agenda was to set higher minimum bonds for judges to impose. 
Alternatively, INS aimed to entirely eliminate immigration judge review of 
their bonds, which would leave INS’ bond decision as final and unreviewable 
by any other agency actor.82  Under the General Counsel’s view, immigration 
judge review of INS bond decisions was an “‘outrageous waste of their time,’ 
time presumably better spent on conducting deportation hearings to reduce 
court delays and absconding.”83  
The DOJ responded to INS’s concerns over immigration judges 
reducing INS bonds, first through the automatic stay regulation.84  Adopted 
initially in 1998, the “automatic stay” created an INS override to an 
immigration judge’s decision to release a noncitizen.85  This regulation 
effectively allows an INS prosecutor, after losing at a bond hearing, to 
overrule the immigration judge’s decision during the appeal period.86  
Initially, the  automatic stay only applied to noncitizens who were deportable 
for certain criminal convictions, and thus subject to laws that required either 
presumptive or mandatory detention.87  In the wake of the September 11, 
 
 81. Roberts, supra note 4, at 8–9.  It is important to note that immigration prosecutors have 
multiple reasons to oppose release.  First, they perform a law enforcement role of protecting the 
public against those they perceive to be dangerous.  Second, they seek to ensure that persons do not 
frustrate efforts at future deportation, should that be ordered.  See Demore v Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
517–21 (2003) (discussing government’s stated goals of immigration detention).  Finally, there is 
an unspoken goal of detention: immigration prosecutors are more likely to obtain a removal order 
because detainees often give up meritorious claims, are less adequately prepared with evidence to 
support their claims, and are less likely to obtain representation.  See Jayashri Srikantiah, 
Reconsidering Money Bail in Immigration Detention, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 521, 542 (2018). 
 82. Gilboy, Setting Bail, supra note 37, at 394–95 (citing Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen. Couns., 
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., Speech at the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
Annual Conference (June 4–9, 1985) (on file with Convention Seminar Cassettes)).   
 83. Id. at 350 (quoting Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen. Couns., IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION 
SERV., Speech at the American Immigration Lawyers Association Annual Conference (June 4–9, 
1985) (on file with Convention Seminar Cassettes)). 
 84. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c)(1)–(5), 1003.19(i)(2) (2020).  For critiques of this regulation, see 
Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s Order: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 90 (2010); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process 
Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1030–31 (2002); Marks, An Urgent 
Priority, supra note 4, at 12; David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for 
the Enemy Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 312–13 (2004) (arguing that the press 
distorted the meaning of the DOJ’s actions in its expansion of the automatic stay regulation post 
9/11, but that the regulation still needs to be revisited). 
 85. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for Custody 
Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,443, 27,447 (May 19, 1998) (codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 3, 236). 
 86. Jorjani, supra note 84, at 101. 
 87. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for Custody 
Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,443, 27,447 (May 19, 1998) (codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 3, 236); see also Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 83–88 (describing the 
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2001 terrorist attacks Attorney General Ashcroft expanded the authority in 
an interim regulation, which he promulgated quickly without awaiting the 
comment period.88  Under the 2001 interim regulation, the INS trial attorney 
could invoke this authority in any case where the INS set either no bond or a 
minimum bond of $10,000 in its original custody determination.89  No longer 
was the authority limited to those who were deemed presumptively 
unbailable by Congress.90  Thus, the INS could essentially determine the 
outcome of a bond hearing before an immigration judge by setting an initial 
bond of at least $10,000 or no bond, thereby allowing its prosecutors to later 
invoke the automatic stay and hold someone in detention regardless of the 
immigration judge’s ruling.91   
The final rule was issued in 2006 after a notice-and-comment period in 
which modest changes were made to the final rule, none of which addressed 
concerns over immigration judge independence.92  Responding to comments 
that the automatic stay undermined immigration judge independence, EOIR 
characterized immigration judges and immigration prosecutors (who at that 
point were housed within the DHS) as all acting together, carrying out the 
 
evolution of the statute governing detention of those convicted of certain crimes and terrorism, 
which at first rendered detainees “presumptively unbailable” and now requires mandatory detention 
without a bond hearing).  
 88. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 54,909, 54,910 (Oct. 31, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 89. Id. at 54,910. 
 90. See Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for 
Custody Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,447. 
 91. Some habeas courts addressed the adjudicator independence problem that the 2001 version 
of the regulation created.  See, e.g., Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) 
(reasoning that the automatic stay “produces a patently unfair situation by ‘tak[ing] the stay decision 
out of the hands of the judges altogether and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition 
failed to persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified.’”) (quoting Cole, supra 
note 84, at 1031) (alteration in original); Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-01796 WHA, 2005 WL 
1514122, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (holding that the regulation was ultra vires as it 
“eliminate[d] the discretionary authority of immigration judges to determine whether an individual 
may be released, thereby exceeding the authority bestowed” by Congress and reasoning that it 
“impermissibly merge[d] the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor.”); Almonte-Vargas v. 
Elwood, No. CIV.A. 02-CV-2666, 2002 WL 1471555, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (describing 
the automatic stay as “accomplishing Petitioner’s mandatory detention” by allowing the trial 
attorney to override the judge’s release order). 
 92. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 57,873 (Oct. 2, 2006) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 1003).  The final rule set a time limit on the duration of the automatic stay, providing that it 
would expire in ninety days if the Board did not decide the appeal of the bond decision.  Id. at 
57,874.  The final rule also requires that a supervisory DHS officer sign off on the automatic stay 
filing, and that the DHS certify that there is factual and legal support for its position.  Id. 
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Attorney General’s broad authority to detain and release a noncitizen on bond 
pending a decision to deport.93 
A second example of the undermining of immigration judges’ 
independence in detention decisions involves a pair of detention-related 
decisions made by two different Attorneys General pursuant to the referral 
authority.94  The referral authority regulation allows the Attorney General to 
take a decision away from the Board and become the final adjudicator on a 
legal issue.  The first detention case of importance is Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s 2003 decision in In re D-J-.95  In that case, Attorney General 
Ashcroft instructed judges and the Board to consider national security 
interests—including deterring mass migrations from one country—in 
addition to dangerousness and flight risk when making bond 
determinations.96  Earlier in the proceedings, the Judge and Board had 
rejected such arguments by the government and released a Haitian detainee 
on bond.97  Having lost these arguments, the Attorney General converted 
himself from the nation’s top law enforcement officer into the nation’s top 
immigration adjudicator, utilizing the referral authority to change the rules of 
bond determinations to accommodate his enforcement priorities.   
Over a decade later, under the Obama administration, the DHS reprised 
the deterrence rationale, citing In re D-J-, to detain Central American 
migrants after a “surge” of border crossings in 2014.98  In a class action 
lawsuit more than a decade after In re D-J-, a federal district court held that 
general deterrence of future border crossers was not a permissible reason to 
justify civil detention.99  For the many Haitian detainees who lost their bond 
hearings in the immediate aftermath of In re D-J-, but before the class action 
suit, no federal court stepped in to tell immigration adjudicators that it was 
unconstitutional to consider deterrence into a bond decision.  Only twelve 
 
 93. Id. at 57,877 (“Under longstanding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
Attorney General has had broad detention authority. Now, after enactment of the HSA, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security exercises that discretion in carrying out the detention and enforcement 
authority formerly administered by the INS, and the Attorney General and his delegates (the Board 
and the immigration judges) exercise that discretion in the review of the custody decisions initially 
made by DHS.”) (citations omitted).  Once the final regulation went into effect, setting a time limit 
of ninety days on the duration of detention under the automatic stay, many habeas courts were not 
able to reach a decision on the legal challenge because the issue became moot.  See, e.g., Hussain 
v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2007); Altayar v. Lynch, No. CV-16-02479-PHX-GMS 
(JZB), 2016 WL 7383340, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 2016).  
 94. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2020).  
 95. 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003). 
 96. Id. at 581. 
 97. Id. at 573–74. 
 98. R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 99. Id. at 188–89. 
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years later was the government told by an Article III court that bond decisions 
justified by the deterrence rationale were illegal.100 
A more recent detention case is Attorney General Barr’s 2019 decision 
in In re M-S-,101 which entirely removed immigration judges’ discretion over 
bond for some asylum-seekers.102  This decision specifically overruled a 2005 
Board decision that asylum-seekers who recently crossed the border were 
eligible for bond.103  The M-S- decision was enjoined pending a challenge in 
federal court,104 yet the Supreme Court in 2021 vacated that order and 
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.105 It is uncertain whether the M-S- 
decision will suffer the same demise as the deterrence rationale for detention 
that Attorney General Ashcroft established in D-J-.106  Regardless of the fate 
of this decision, it stands as another example of an affront to immigration 
judges’ independence that Article III courts must consistently police.107  
Significantly troubling is that the decision came on the heels of empirical 
findings that, for recently-arrived families seeking asylum, immigration 
judges were routinely lowering bonds initially set by the DHS, putting 
freedom within reach while the families fought their cases.108  The M-S- 
decision represents Attorney General Barr going even further to take away 
immigration judges’ independence than Attorney General Ashcroft, in 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019). 
 102. Id. at 509–10, 518–19. 
 103. See id. at 519 (overruling Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 735–36 (BIA 2005)).  
 104. See Padilla v. ICE, No. 19-35565, __ F.3d __, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 9603, *12–13, 15–
27 (9th Cir. March 27, 2020). 
 105. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t v. Padilla, 141 S. Ct. 1041 (2021).  The Court ordered the Ninth 
Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of its 2020 holding in Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. 
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).  Padilla, 141 S. Ct. at 1041–42.  In Thursaissigiam, the 
Court considered a Due Process challenge to immigration procedures brought by a noncitizen who 
physically entered the United States but was arrested by immigration authorities close to the border.  
140 S.Ct. at 1981–82. The Court held that the Due Process clause did not apply because the 
noncitizen’s status was assimilated to that of an “alien seeking initial entry,” who do not enjoy any 
Due Process protections.  Id.  
 106. See R.I.L.-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 188–89; see also HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IS 
MANDATORY DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENTRANTS SEEKING ASYLUM CONSTITUTIONAL? 4 
(2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10343. 
 107. See Letter from Robert M. Carlson, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to William P. Barr, U.S. 
Att’y Gen. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
government_affairs_office/aba-letter-to-ag-barrre-matter-of-m-s-4-23-19.pdf (“We are also 
concerned that this decision [in Matter of M-S-] is one more step in a series of recent actions by the 
Department of Justice to remove discretion and restrict the authority of immigration judges.”). 
 108. See INGRID EAGLY, STEVEN SHAFER, & JANA WHALLEY, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, 
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response to a President who demanded more detention to deter future border-
crossers and appease his political base.109 
While many have critiqued the Attorney General’s referral authority,110 
former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and DOJ Office of Immigration 
Litigation (“OIL”) attorney Patrick Glen defended the authority in a 2016 law 
review article.111  Gonzales and Glen tell the story of a Board that is not an 
independent adjudicatory body at all, but rather a set of attorneys who serve 
to advise the Attorney General.112  This view presents a clear contradiction 
to the way the NAIJ, various committees of Congress, lawyers, and scholars 
have viewed the role of immigration adjudicators—as independent actors 
who should be free from political influence.113  Rather, Gonzales and Glen 
unabashedly describe the Board as part of the DOJ’s policymaking 
 
 109. See Schmidt, supra note 14; Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving 




 110. See, e.g., Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. ONLINE. 129, 153 (2017) (arguing that the attorney general review authority has “interrupted 
the development of immigration law by the judiciary, altered legislative standards, and restructured 
the agency’s own application of immigration policy, often with partisan interests in mind.”); 
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1671–72 (“In the present 
context, agency head review is particularly troublesome because the agency head is the attorney 
general, who serves as the nation’s chief law enforcement official.  Allowing a law enforcement 
official to reverse the decision of an adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—particularly in 
proceedings in which the government is one of the opposing parties.”); Jill E. Family, Beyond 
Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 541, 544 (2011); Justin Chasco, Judge Alberto Gonzales? The Attorney General’s 
Power to Overturn Board of Immigration Appeals’ Decisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 363, 381 (2007); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of 
Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 288 (2002) (“To critics, Attorney General review of BIA 
decisions violates the independence of the Board, and (especially when review is at the behest of 
the INS) breaches the separation of function between the immigration enforcers at INS and the 
adjudicators at the Executive Office for Immigration Review.”); BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra 
note 4, at 244–45, 248; Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and 
the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 458–62 (2007); Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra 
note 4, at 17–18; Levinson, A Specialized Court, supra note 4, at 650. 
 111. Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy 
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 848–50 (2016). 
 112. See id. at 848–57.  In response to critiques about how this authority encroaches on the 
Board’s independence, Gonzales and Glen state, “The Attorney General is not usurping the 
authority of the Board when he reviews its decisions, but is exercising an authority that has been 
given to him by Congress.”  Id. at 899.  They cite to one AG’s justification of this authority, “[T]he 
Board acts on the Attorney General’s behalf rather than as an independent body.  The relationship 
between the Board and the Attorney General thus is analogous to an employee and his superior 
rather than to the relationship between an administrative agency and a reviewing court.”  Id. at 899–
900 (quoting Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 289 n.9 (A.G. 1991) (alteration in 
original)).  
 113. See supra note 4. 
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process.114  They write that “the referral authority [to the Attorney General] 
can be a robust tool for the advancement of executive branch immigration 
policy,”115 and describe several examples of Attorneys General “setting 
policy” through the review authority so that future cases decided by 
immigration judges and the Board would be bound by that policy.116  
Although it is true that agency head review is common across administrative 
law,117 the Department of Justice, which litigates on behalf of agencies, 
usually does not have authority over the administrative adjudications of other 
executive branch agencies.118   
What is particularly troubling about this review authority is that the OIL 
and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office, which both prosecute immigration cases 
when they reach the federal courts, are also housed within the DOJ.119  It 
would presumably be quite easy for these prosecutors—who advocate for 
interpretations of immigration statutes that result in deportation, detention, or 
denial of immigration status—to persuade their boss to issue a decision that 
favors their position before a federal court.120  Considering that the Attorney 
 
 114. Gonzales and Glen Gonzales describe the referral authority as “adjudication” 
notwithstanding its proposed use in policymaking, which is a separate function.  See Gonzales & 
Glen, supra note 111, at 896. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See id. at 874–85.  Indeed, they argue  that  attorney general review is disfavored when the 
issue is discretionary, fact-determinative, or “not susceptible to bright-line rulemaking.”  Id. at 860. 
 117. See Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 110, at 458; Peter L. 
Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections 
on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1270 
(1974). 
 118. See Taylor, supra note 110, at 294; see also Shah, supra note 110, at 136 (noting that the 
“exercise of the referral and review power [by the AG] runs counter to administrative decision-
making norms and may even be unconstitutional.”) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 159 
(1945)); Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1672 (“Allowing a 
law enforcement official to reverse the decision of an adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—
particularly in proceedings in which the government is one of the opposing parties.”). 
 119. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(k) (2020).  When a noncitizen files a petition for review of an order 
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the Office of Immigration Litigation Appellate Section 
normally defends the government’s position before the circuit court of appeals.  See Appellate 
Section, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CIV. DIV., OFF. OF IMMIGR. LITIG., (last updated Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/civil/appellate-section.  When an immigration case reaches the federal 
district court through a habeas petition (where an immigration detainee challenges unlawful 
detention), mandamus action (where a noncitizen asks the court to force the agency to adjudicate a 
case), or APA petition (where a federal court reviews the denial of an immigration petition by the 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), the U.S. Attorney’s Office normally defends the 
government’s position, unless the U.S. Attorney’s Office decides to call upon OIL’s District Court 
Section.  See District Court Section, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CIV. DIV., OFF. OF IMMIGR. LITIG., (last 
updated Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/civil/district-court-section. 
 120. See Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n et al., in Support of 
Reconsideration of Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec 687 (AG 2008) 10, 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/amicus-brief-cristoval-silva-trevino (“Because the Office of 
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General frequently writes published opinions defining ambiguous 
immigration law terms, and thus arguably commanding of Chevron deference 
with that decision so long as it reasonable,121 the prosecutors can almost 
guarantee a win in court by pushing their boss to interpret a statute in a way 
that favors their litigation position.122 As a result, noncitizens and their 
advocates lose faith in the immigration adjudication system, which ostensibly 
exists to provide a neutral forum, yet permits the prosecutor’s opinion to 
become law.123  
C. The Increasingly Frail Independence of Immigration Judges 
The DOJ’s control over immigration adjudication has steadily 
increased.  The Trump administration’s Attorneys General made broad-brush 
asylum decisions, seeking to cut off asylum eligibility to various groups.124  
Proposed asylum rules by the EOIR and the DHS sought to severely limit 
 
Immigration Litigation . . . [is] part of the Department of Justice, and [is] charged with defending 
the agency in court, the Attorney General bears a special responsibility to maintain both the 
appearance and actuality of impartiality in the adjudication of removal charges and to protect the 
certification process from efforts to make it a backdoor mechanism for one-sided ex parte 
communication by the office’s litigators.”); see also Taylor, supra note 110, at 288–89 (describing 
use of attorney general review authority in immigration law to advance the government’s litigation 
position in the Supreme Court case INS v. St. Cyr).  Gonzales and Glen describe this type of non-
objective interference as a “caricature.”  Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 919.  Margaret Taylor 
has disputed such a characterization.  See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: 
Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 
18, 35–36 n.121 (2016). 
 121. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 857; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (holding deference is accorded to an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute so long as the interpretation is reasonable); Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (permitting deference 
to an agency’s change of position within the Chevron framework so long as the agency adequately 
explains that change).  But see Shah, supra note 110, at 141 (“[B]ecause the Attorney General is 
removed from the agency’s expertise in immigration, scholars might also debate the proper level of 
judicial deference to administrative decision-making in immigration or perhaps any are of law in 
which a political official exercise [sic] discretion beyond her core competencies.”). 
 122. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 919 (acknowledging that “Attorney General 
review could have beneficial effects on litigation, in the form of a final agency decision that would 
be entitled to Chevron deference before the courts,” but asserting that “the machinery of referral 
and review is not aimed at such ends.”).  But see Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688–
89 (A.G. 2008) (invoking Brand X to justify the AG’s decision to modify interpretation of moral 
turpitude statute); Taylor, supra note 110, at 288 (“The Attorney General interceded to vacate a rare 
en banc opinion of the BIA at a critical juncture—on precisely the date that the Solicitor General’s 
brief was due—to clear the way for the INS to assert a contrary interpretation before the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 123. See Taylor, supra note 110, at 273–74. 
 124. See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596–97 (A.G. 2019) (overturning Board 
case law that family can establish a particular social group); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 
2018) (overturning a BIA precedential decision in In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), 
that victims of domestic violence can establish a particular social group). 
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immigration judges’ independence by creating categories of asylum claims 
to presumptively deny.125  These efforts aimed to ensure that fewer people 
could qualify for asylum.126  New case law implemented by Attorney General 
Sessions also ensured that more asylum-seekers could suffer summary 
deportation orders before the full adjudication of their claims.127  New case 
law and policy aiming to reduce asylum eligibility also leads to more 
detention given recent Board case law permitting immigration judges to find 
those with weak asylum claims to be a presumptive flight risks in bond 
hearings.128  
There are other examples of the DOJ asserting control over immigration 
adjudicators.  A “gag rule,” refusing to allow immigration judges to speak to 
the public has become the subject of First Amendment litigation.129  
 
 125. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable 
Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (June 15, 2020); Letter from Round Table of Former Immigration 
Judges to Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Dir., Off. of Pol’y, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. and Maureen 
Dunn, Chief, Div. of Humanitarian Affs., Off. of Pol’y & Strategy 13 (July 13, 2020) (on file with 
the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges) (“The proposed regulations short-circuit legal 
analysis of an asylum applicant’s claim in particularly dangerous ways, by providing a checklist of 
groups that would be ‘generally’ insufficient to establish a particular social group under the refugee 
definition in order to provide uniformity and save Court time.”). The final rule, which was published 
in December 2020 and would become effective January 2021, was enjoined by a federal district 
court.  See Pangea Legal Svcs v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec’y, __F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 75756, 
*7 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 8, 2021).  
 126. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. 
(June 23, 2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/6/23/taking-a-sledgehammer-to-
asylum.  
 127. Attorney General Sessions reversed Board case law that required immigration judges to 
hear testimony from an asylum applicant even if the applicant had not made out a prima facie case 
for asylum prior to the testimony. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to 
Immigration Court?, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-to-immigration-
court.  Attorney General Sessions further announced in A-B- that immigration judges need not 
examine the remaining elements of an asylum claim if there is one flaw in the case.  Id.  Former 
immigration judge Jeffrey Chase noted that these two cases reminded immigration judges that they 
could speed up deportation orders by refusing to permit more testimony, which would assist in their 
production quotas because they could complete cases more quickly.  Id.; see also supra Part I.A. 
(describing the 2018 proposal for individual production quotas on immigration judges). 
 128. See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 806–07 (BIA 2020) (upholding an 
immigration judge’s bond denial based on flight risk and reasoning that “for various reasons, 
eligibility for asylum can be difficult to establish, and an Immigration Judge may consider an alien’s 
circumstances in determining how likely it is that his application for relief will ultimately be 
approved.”); Jeffrey S. Chase, BIA: “Lock Them Up!”, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Apr. 6, 
2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/4/6/bia-lock-them-up (critiquing R-A-V-P- by 
stating, “[t]he question isn’t whether the respondent will be granted asylum; it’s whether his 
application for asylum will provide enough impetus for him to appear for his hearings relating to 
such relief.  From my experience both as an attorney and an immigration judge, the answer in this 
case is yes.”). 
 129. Jacqueline Thomsen, Immigration Judges Sue DOJ, Alleging Unconstitutional Gag on 
Speech, NAT’L L.J. (July 1, 2020), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/ 
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Previously, immigration judges regularly spoke to audiences such as law 
students and practicing lawyers to discuss immigration law and procedures, 
giving a short disclaimer that their views did not represent those of their 
agency.130  This ended when EOIR set forth a policy that required the judges 
to seek permission from the agency director and then repeatedly refused such 
permission, silencing judges during a time when they could provide input on 
rapidly-changing immigration laws and procedures.131  This policy ensured 
that the judges could not publicly express dissent about the agency’s 
immigration agenda.132 
An interim rule announced in August 2019,133 which became final in 
early November 2020, grants adjudication authority to the EOIR director—
an appointee of the Attorney who directly reports to the Deputy Attorney 
General.134  The NAIJ has critiqued this rule because it permits the EOIR 
director to “unilaterally rewrite immigration law with the issuance of 
precedential cases, without even the internal checks in place for the 
certification process that apply to the Attorney General.”135 This regulation 
allows a political appointee to write precedential case law that immigration 
judges and Board members are bound to follow, thus putting in in place a 
mechanism that permits top political actors at DOJ to substitute their own 
views for that of the supposedly independent adjudicators.136 
The EOIR director, amid the financial crisis brought on by the COVID-
19 pandemic, offered to buy out Board members appointed before the Trump 
 
2020.07.01.01.pdf.  EOIR is undertaking full review of the agency’s policy regarding judges 
speaking in public, which has put the litigation on hold.  Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University, Lawsuit: National Association of Immigration Judges v. McHenry (last 
visited May 28, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/cases/naij-v-mchenry.  
 130. Cristian Farias, The Trump Administration is Gagging America’s Immigration Judges, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/immigration-
judges-first-amendment/607195/.  
 131. Id.  
 132. See id. 
 133. Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,537 (Aug. 
26, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1292). 
 134. See Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 69,465  
(Nov. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1292); Abigail Hauslohner, New Rule 




 135. The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts: Hearing 
before Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 8 (2020) 
(statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. J.), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-Wstate-
TabaddorA-20200129.pdf.  
 136. See id. 
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administration, proposing financial incentives if they retired or resigned.137  
The American Immigration Lawyers Association critiqued this as an attempt 
to replace existing Board members with new Board members who would 
have higher asylum denial rates.138  Although none of the existing Board 
members took the offer, it represents another example of politics playing a 
role in deciding who will be an immigration adjudicator.139  It is yet another 
example of how the structure of the immigration adjudication system—with 
adjudicators as employees of the DOJ—can impact who becomes an 
adjudicator and thus control the decisions they make.140 
In August 2020, the EOIR proposed new rules that would eliminate 
procedural devices that immigration adjudicators use to benefit noncitizens, 
such as sua sponte reopening authority, BIA remands to consider new 
evidence, and administrative closure.141  Sua sponte reopening authority 
gives immigration judges or Board members the option to reopen a case even 
when a noncitizen has not met requirements such as the time or numerical 
limits on a motion to reopen.142 BIA remand authority permits the Board to 
remand when new evidence or relief becomes available while a case is on 
appeal.143 Administrative closure authority allows an immigration judge to 
take a case off of the court’s regular docket, typically because an application 
is pending before the Citizenship and Immigration Services agency and that 
application, if granted, would provide new relief for a noncitizen in 
immigration court.144  Although they have been preliminarily enjoined by a 
 
 137. Tanvi Misra, DOJ memo offered to buy out immigration board members, ROLL CALL (May 
27, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/27/doj-memo-offered-to-buy-out-
immigration-board-members/.  
 138. Id.; see also Press Release, Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n, EOIR Director Attempts to Buy Out 
Remaining Board Members to Solidify Control of Immigration Courts, AILA Doc. No. 20052830 
(May 28, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2020/eoir-director-attempts-to-
buy-out-remaining-. 
 139. See Misra, supra note 137; see also supra Part I.A. (describing politicized hiring of 
immigration judges under Attorney General Ashcroft). 
 140. See Misra, supra note 137. 
 141. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative 
Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,491, 52,491–52,506 (Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 
1240). 
 142. Am. Immigr. Coun., Practice Advisory: The Basics of Motions to Reopen EOIR-Issued 
Removal Orders 2–3 (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/the_basics_of_motions_to_reopen_eoir-issued_removal_ 
orders_practice_advisory.pdf.  
 143. Aruna Sury, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Practice Advisory: Motions before the BIA 
2-3 (March 2020), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/motions_with_bia-final.pdf.  
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federal district court,145 these proposed rules present yet another attack on 
adjudicators’ independence, as they reduce the flexibility and discretion 
immigration judges have to use procedural mechanisms to improve a 
noncitizen’s chances of success in a removal hearing.146  
The EOIR also issued a press release boasting about increases in 
deportation orders during the Trump administration, apparently unconcerned 
that, as the agency housing the adjudicators, it should at least appear to be 
impartial.147  Meanwhile, Board members, answering only to only one 
master, have gone so far as to defy a remand order by a federal appeals court, 
describing the federal court’s decision as incorrect because the Attorney 
General said so.148 
These systemic problems with a biased immigration adjudication 
system have become the subject of recent federal court litigation.  In 
December 2019, immigrants’ rights organizations brought a lawsuit alleging 
violations under the U.S. Constitution, Immigration and Nationality Act, and 
Administrative Procedure Act, which gave rise to a biased immigration 
adjudication system.149  In July 2020, the federal district court presiding over 
the suit allowed the case to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss for the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the administrative of the immigration courts violates the 
immigration statute’s “impartial adjudicator” requirement, recognizing that 
there is “at least plausible evidence of systemic bias” in the immigration 
adjudication system.150  
The many examples explained in this Section show how frail an 
immigration judges’ independence is, especially when it comes to the 
important question of determining physical liberty from detention.  A recent 
study examining immigration judges’ bond decisions from 2001 through 
 
 145. See Centro De La Raza v. EOIR, 2021 WL 916804, at *1 (N. D. Ca. Mar. 10, 2021). 
 146. See Emily Creighton, Department of Justice Proposes New Limit to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ Power, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://immigrationimpact.com/2020/08/25/board-immigration-appeals-2020-rule/#.X1dol_lKjIV.  
 147. See Marouf, supra note 4, at 711–12; Jeffrey S. Chase, The Need for an Independent 
Immigration Court, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/17/the-need-for-an-independent-immigration-court.  
 148. Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 2020) (“What happened next beggars 
belief.  The Board of Immigration Appeals wrote, on the basis of a footnote in a letter the Attorney 
General issued after our opinion, that our decision is incorrect.”). 
 149. See Complaint at 52–61, Las Americas Immigr. Advoc. Ctr. v. Trump (No. 3:19-cv-2051), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/documents/ecf_1_las_americas_v._trump_no._19-cv-
02051-sb_d._or.pdf.  
 150. Las Americas Immigr. Advoc. Ctr., 475 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1201, 1215 (D. Or. 2020).  As 
evidence of such bias, the court cited the unusually high rates of asylum denials in some immigration 
courts, the case completion goals, and statements made by Trump administration Attorneys General 
suggesting that asylum seekers are “‘breaking into this country’ and ‘exploiting’ the process,’” 
while making “baseless [asylum] claims.”  Id. at 1214 (alteration in original). 
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2019 suggested that the current president in power, not the president whose 
Attorney General appointed the judge, was the key indicator of outcome.151  
In bond decisions, noncitizens fared worse in the Trump administration than 
in the Obama or George W. Bush administrations.152  
One can be optimistic that all of these attacks on immigration 
adjudicators’ independence will die down in the Biden administration.153  
However, the Biden administration has not prioritized reform to the 
immigration adjudication system, and EOIR is still primarily staffed by 
Trump appointees.154  The 300 immigration judges appointed during the 
Trump administration increased the asylum denial rate from 50 percent 
during the Obama years to 72 percent during the Trump years.155  
Furthermore, assigning important liberty decisions to an agent of the 
prosecutor, regardless of the politics of that prosecutor, is a system that must 
be fixed.  To use the cautionary words of Gerald Neuman, “[t]he ability to 
determine the scope of one’s own authority . . . is too great a power to place 
in the hands that already wield the sword.”156  
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF ARTICLE III JUDGES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
DECISIONS 
This Part describes how, in the modern era of immigration detention, 
Article III judges have played a significant role in immigration detention 
decisions.  Despite efforts by Congress to curtail Article III judges’ 
jurisdiction, Article III courts, in one way or another, have continued to 
monitor immigration detention.  For immigration detainees, the Supreme 
Court has at times been their hero, vindicating the right to physical liberty.  
At other times it has been their villain, allowing executive officers to play an 
 
 151. See Kim & Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, supra note 13, at 1885–
91.  The authors acknowledge that their study did not control for factors that could impact the 
outcomes, such as the individual circumstances of the noncitizen, the demographic characteristics 
of the immigration judges, changes in migration patterns, sociopolitical or socioeconomic contexts, 
geographic factors, or actions by other actors such as Congress, federal courts, or the Board.  Id. at 
1866.  The authors suggested future empirical research that would account for such factors.  Id. at 
1891. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 9 (proposing that immigration court reform should be a major 
priority of a Biden administration); AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, A Vision for America as a 
Welcoming Nation: AILA Recommendations for the Future of Immigration, AILA Doc. No. 
20110933, 6 (Nov. 10, 2020) (recommending the creation of an Article I immigration court that is 
independent from the DOJ). 
 154. Gregory Chen, JustSecurity: Biden’s First 100 Days on Immigration: A Test of Leadership 
(Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75934/bidens-first-100-days-on-immigration-a-test-
of-leadership/. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Neuman, supra note 43, at 1024. 
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outsized role in liberty decisions.  In spite of these forces, lower Article III 
courts have continued to play a significant role in deciding physical liberty, 
refusing to simply assign such important decisions to immigration police and 
prosecutors.  
This Article’s omission of a more detailed history of immigration 
detention157 does not suggest there was no judicial involvement in monitoring 
immigration detention, particularly during the earliest years of federal 
immigration regulation158 and when detention became a tool of social control 
during the Red Scare.159  As of 1954, the official DOJ policy was to make 
immigration detention the exception;160 this caused a 90% reduction in 
immigration detention.161  During the next several decades, bail was the norm 
for those undergoing deportation proceedings.162  Release on parole was also 
the norm for those in exclusion proceedings because they were not “‘clearly 
and beyond a doubt entitled to land,’” notwithstanding the statute’s mandate 
to detain these individuals.163  This use of immigration detention as the 
exception continued until the 1980s.164 
A. Litigation Concerning Haitian Detainees 
The 1980 Mariel boatlift marked what Jonathan Simon has described as 
“part of a larger series of immigration flows during the 1980s that would 
 
 157. Daniel Wilsher and César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández have given more comprehensive 
historical summaries of U.S. immigration detention law and policy.  See generally CÉSAR 
CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH 
LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS (2019); WILSHER, supra note 18.  Elliott Young also tells the history of 
U.S. immigration detention with a focus on five stories that illustrate specific detention policies.  
See generally ELLIOT YOUNG, FOREVER PRISONS: HOW THE UNITED STATES MADE THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM (2021).  
 158. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 launched a “habeas corpus mill,” where lower federal 
courts frequently ruled in favor of the Chinese, who were challenging their exclusions.  See Christian 
G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century “Habeas Corpus Mill”: The Chinese Before the Federal Courts in 
California, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347, 348 (1988); see generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH 
AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 18 (1995).  
 159. Daniel Wilsher describes courts’ decisions limiting indefinite detention for those who could 
not be deported because they were stateless due to borders shifting in the post-war period. See 
WILSHER, supra note 18, at 29–34. 
 160. Address by Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Humanizing the 
Administration of the Immigration Law (Jan. 26, 1955), https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/12/01-26-1955.pdf. 
 161. Will Maslow, Recasting our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 
309, 360–61 (1956). 
 162. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 58. 
 163. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age, 10 Public Culture 577, 581 (1998); see also 
8 U.S.C. § 12251225(b)(1)(B)(IV) (statute mandating detention for “arriving aliens”); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(d)(5) (statute providing for parole). 
 164. Simon, supra note 163, at 578-79. 
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transform the face of immigration to the United States.”165  Previously, those 
seeking to enter the United States without permission were primarily 
Mexican, and they typically accepted deportation once apprehended rather 
than seeking asylum.166  But the new illegal entrants of the 1980s, hailing 
from the Caribbean and Central America, raised colorable claims under the 
recently-enacted Refugee Act.167  The INS deemed these new refugees 
dangerous and undesirable, yet the Refugee Act removed the INS’s discretion 
to summarily exclude them.168  The Reagan administration’s response was 
more detention and fewer grants of parole to arriving asylum-seekers, a 
practice intended to deter future migrants.169  According to Attorney General 
William French Smith, “[d]etention of aliens seeking asylum was necessary 
to discourage people like the Haitians from setting sail in the first place.”170 
A class of detainees sued, claiming that the new parole policy did not 
follow the proper administrative law procedures and denied them equal 
protection because it discriminated on the basis of race and national origin.171  
A federal district court decided that the new policy violated the 
administrative law requirement of notice and comment and ordered the 
release of 1,700 class members.172  After this order, the INS promulgated new 
regulations that complied with its obligations under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, and many were released under the new regulations.173  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court, in the 1985 case Jean v. Nelson,174 decided that 
the statute and new regulations required nondiscrimination in the 
consideration of parole; the Court did not reach the equal protection claim.175  
 
 165. Id. at 582. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.; see also Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 168. Simon, supra note 163, at 582–83.  
 169. Id. at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy was aimed at substituting the deterrent of the 
prison for the removal discretion lost to the Refugee Act.”); see also Louis v. Nelson 544 F. Supp. 
973, 979–81 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (discussing President Reagan’s adoption of the federal task force’s 
recommendation to use detention as deterrence, and stating that “[t]he policy was designed to deal 
with another Mariel type situation, regardless of the nationality or number of the arriving aliens”). 
 170. MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 7 (2004). 
 171. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985). 
 172. Id. at 850. 
 173. Id. at 850. 
 174. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
 175. Id. at 854–55, 857.  Hiroshi Motomura describes the Jean case as an example where the 
Court applied “phantom norms,” whereby important constitutional rights are realized through 
statutory interpretation.  Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547–49 (1990).  
The Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the parole policy violated equal 
protection, which would have required it to either accept or reject past holdings that the political 
branches have plenary power over immigration decisions.  See id. at 547; see also Jean, 472 U.S. 
at 868–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reaching the constitutional issue and deciding that, contrary to 
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One lesson that can be gleaned from the Jean litigation is that federal 
courts became more involved in scrutinizing executive officers’ parole 
decisions, causing the INS to recalibrate its parole policies.176  Even if the 
abuse of discretion standard of review was quite deferential to INS officers,177 
it demonstrated a federal court monitoring individual decisions about 
immigration detainees’ physical liberty.178  As Jonathan Simon writes, 
detention became the source of rights, notwithstanding the plenary power that 
caused courts to give immense deference to the political actors in this 
context.179  Ironically, the judiciary’s invocation of some rights for even the 
most rights-less (those who had never legally entered the United States)180 
may have prompted the executive branch to interdict Haitian refugees on the 
high seas to prevent them from reaching U.S. territory and jails, where they 
had access to lawyers and the protections of the Constitution.181 
B. Litigation Concerning the 1996 Detention Laws 
Congress prioritized detention as social control in the late 1980s and 
1990s, which César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández describes as part of a 
broader effort to incarcerate more people of color in the war on drugs.182  A 
series of legislative experiments183 led to the 1996 enactment of the 
mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).184  This statute completely 
 
the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, aliens who have not been admitted to the United States do have 
constitutional rights).   
 176. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 850 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985); 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982), as 
amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,494 (1982)).  
 177. The Eleventh Circuit determined that, on remand, the District Court should examine 
individual parole decisions to determine whether the INS officers could advance “facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason[s]” for denying parole.  Jean, 472 U.S. at 853 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 
F.2d. 957, 977 (11th Cir. 1984)).   
 178. On remand, the District Court was to consider whether the INS “made individualized 
determinations of parole” and “exercised this broad discretion under the statutes and regulations 
without regard to race or national origin.”  Id. at 857. 
 179. See Simon, supra note 163, at 600. 
 180. See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note 18, at 61 (“[Mezei] revealed the full extent of the aliens [sic] 
power to create essentially ‘political’ prisoners detained outside the framework of legal rules even 
during peacetime.”). 
 181. See Simon, supra note 163, at 600; see also Sale v. Haitian Cntrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 
160–70 (1993) (describing the history leading up to the Executive Order that required the Coast 
Guard to interdict Haitians on the high seas and return them to Haiti). 
 182. See García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1360–79. 
 183. Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 81–87 (chronicling the set of laws leading up to 
the mandatory detention statute, all of which required the detainee in a crime-related class to bear 
the burden of proving lack of dangerousness or flight risk). 
 184. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226). 
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removed immigration judge review of bond for noncitizens removable for 
terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, noncitizens 
inadmissible for crime-related reasons, and noncitizens deportable due to 
multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, firearms offenses, aggravated 
felonies, drug crimes.185  No longer would the habeas court oversee bond 
decisions made by executive officials if proceedings became prolonged, in 
contrast to the 1952 provisions.186  Also gone was any six-month limitation 
on detention following a final order of removal,187 which had been included 
in earlier immigration statutes out of recognition that indefinite detention 
would be unconstitutional.188  Instead, the statute gave discretion to INS 
officials over all post-order detention decisions, with no judicial role 
anticipated.189  
Congress also made all discretionary decisions related to detention 
unreviewable by Article III courts.190  This was part of a broader 
 
 185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000).  Only in cases of witness protection can an immigration 
judge decide whether to release a noncitizen in these categories on bond.  Id. 
 186. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, sec. 242(a), 66 
Stat. 209 (1952) (requiring judicial oversight through habeas corpus when the “Attorney General is 
not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the particular facts and 
circumstances in the case of any alien to determine deportability”); see also IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-607 (1996) (removing this portion of the 1952 
language). 
 187. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The 
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 61 (2001). 
 188. See Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1011.  The Senate 
Report for the Hobbs Act, which provides the legislative history of what became the Internal 
Security Act of 1950 (“ISA”), stated:  
[t]he bill, as it passed the House of Representatives, provided power in the Attorney 
General to indefinitely detain deportable aliens in certain cases.  This provision in the bill 
as it passed the House of Representatives appears to present a constitutional question.  
The committee, without undertaking to pass on the constitutionality of this provision, has 
decided to delete the provision and to provide in its stead penal provisions to be invoked 
by judicial process against deportable aliens in the subversive, criminal, and immoral 
classes who fail to depart from the United States.   
S. REP. NO. 81-2239, at 8–9 (1950) (facilitating deportation of aliens); see also Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952) (referring to the legislative history of the Hobbs Act as providing such 
history for the ISA, since it contained almost identical language).  The 1952 INA retained the six-
month limit on detention following a deportation order.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952). 
 189. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(1996).  David Martin discusses the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) version of the statute, which would have mandated detention of all 
noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony.  See Martin, supra note 187, at 63–67.  The IIRIRA 
version gave discretion to the INS to release those who could not be deported under an order of 
supervision, but also added that persons with status violations would also be subjected to the post-
order removal statute.  Id. at 67.  Thus, this statute now applied to ninety-seven percent of 
noncitizens ordered removed.  Id. 
 190. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000).  Section 1226(e) was enacted with IIRIRA and reads: “The 
Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be 
subject to review.  No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this 
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Congressional agenda to remove many immigration questions from review 
by Article III courts,191 especially discretionary decisions.192 These efforts 
ironically resulted in more immigration cases being reviewed by federal 
courts, since new questions of jurisdiction created its own subset of 
litigation.193  This statute further limited the role the Supreme Court had 
assigned to federal judges when it held in the 1952 case Carlson v. Landon194 
that there was no right to bail in deportation proceedings.195  While the 
Carlson court upheld the Attorney General’s authority to make discretionary 
bail decisions and to delegate these decisions to his subordinates, the Court 
also held that these decisions were subject to abuse-of-discretion review in 
federal court.196  Congress later removed even this limited role for Article III 
courts.197 
The first of the 1996 detention statutes to reach the Supreme Court was 
the statute dealing with post-removal order detention.  In Zadvydas v. 
Davis,198 the Court decided whether the INS could indefinitely detain lawful 
permanent residents who had been ordered deported because of criminal 
convictions, yet were either stateless or from a country that would not 
repatriate them.199  The Court interpreted the post-order removal statute to 
permit detention for only six months (finding this limit in the 1952 version), 
after which the detainee would be released if deportation was not 
foreseeable.200  By applying due process norms that apply to other types of 
civil detention, Zadvydas stands as a high-water mark for the Court’s 
recognition of constitutional rights for those detained by the immigration 
 
section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or 
parole.”  Id. 
 191. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
229 (2007). 
 192. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999) 
(“[M]any provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts—
indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, 
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2583 (1998).  
 193. See Family, supra note 110, at 583 (“The federal courts, perhaps counterintuitively given 
the cuts in jurisdiction, have also seen huge increases in the numbers of immigration appeals filed 
in the courts of appeals.”); id. at 585 (noting that “stripping judicial review creates litigation over 
the court’s jurisdiction.”). 
 194. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
 195. See id. at 540–41. 
 196. See id.  
 197. See García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1355 (“To an observer of the modern immigration 
detention apparatus, the [Carlson] Court’s reference to discretion sounds quaint, because much of 
that discretion was eliminated in a series of policy practices and statutory enactments beginning in 
the early 1980s and culminating in 1996.”). 
 198. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 199. Id. at 684. 
 200. Id. at 701. 
  
1106 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1076 
 
authorities.201  The Court stated, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from 
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”202  Yet, the 
Court did not go so far as to strike down the statute as unconstitutional.  
Instead, the Court interpreted the statute to allow release if the government 
could not show deportation was foreseeable six months after a final order of 
removal.203  The Court thus resurrected the prior versions of the statute that 
limited post-order detention to six months.204 
Meanwhile, multiple courts of appeals held that the statute mandating 
detention during removal proceedings violated Due Process,205 and even the 
government believed that it was likely to lose when the issue reached the 
Supreme Court, especially when applying the Zadvydas decision.206  Yet, the 
Court upheld the statute against a due process challenge in the 2003 case of 
Demore v. Kim.207  As Margaret Taylor writes, this was the first immigration 
case to reach the Supreme Court after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, so the Court was bowing to executive authority to detain noncitizens 
 
 201. See id. at 690 (comparing indefinite immigration detention to civil commitment, where the 
government must bear the burden of proving that special circumstances, “such as a harm-threatening 
mental illness, outweigh[] the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.’”) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 701.  Justice Breyer’s opinion in Zadvydas signaled an important constitutional ruling; 
it stands as an excellent example of Hiroshi Motomura’s “phantom constitutional norms,” where 
courts undermine the plenary power through statutory interpretation.  See Motomura, supra note 
175, at 549.  The manner of interpretation proved to be instrumental to providing a path to freedom 
for some Mariel Cubans who were never admitted to the United States, yet were ordered excluded 
due to criminal convictions and could not be repatriated.  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 
(2005).  The Court in 2005 applied its Zadvydas holding to inadmissible Cubans, despite the 
government’s arguments that because the Cubans had never been admitted, they should not benefit 
from the Zadvydas holding.  Id. at 382–86.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that 
because the same statute applied to those who had been deported and those who had never been 
admitted to the United States, the Cubans could benefit from the Court’s Zadvydas holding.  Id. 
 204. See Martin, supra note 187, at 73 (“In a move not much seen since Warren Court days, it 
laid down precise numerical guidance for habeas courts. . . . This [six-month] time period was 
expressly borrowed from the long-standing pre-1996 statutory framework for deportable aliens.”). 
 205. See, e.g., Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 537 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
510 (2003); Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 227 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated, Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510 (2003); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, Weber v. Phu 
Chang Hoang, 538 U.S. 1010 (2003); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated, 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 206. As Margaret Taylor writes, the government viewed the Demore v. Kim case as one “[t]he 
INS wouldn’t mind losing.”  Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to 
Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (2005).  Also, several former INS employees 
signed an amicus brief in Demore v. Kim, supporting Mr. Kim in his argument that mandatory 
detention violated Due Process.  Id. 
 207. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
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deemed a threat.208  The Demore Court reasoned that because such periods of 
detention were brief, a categorical rule of detention without an individualized 
hearing was constitutionally permissible.209  Justice Kennedy warned in his 
concurrence, though, that if mandatory detention becomes unreasonably 
prolonged, it no longer serves the statute’s goals.210  
C. Litigation Concerning Prolonged Detention and Procedural 
Protections in Bond Hearings 
Following Demore, multiple courts held that once mandatory detention 
became unreasonably prolonged, detainees were entitled to a bond hearing.211  
Detention lengths were quite staggering: for a class of detainees challenging 
their prolonged detention without periodic (or in some cases any) bond 
hearings, detention lengths averaged between 346–427 days, with some 
lasting up to 1,585 days.212  Although the statute no longer contained the 1952 
allowance for judicial involvement if the government did not act with 
“reasonable dispatch” in the proceedings,213 courts still saw themselves in the 
role of monitoring detention without a bond hearing if detention during 
proceedings lasted too long. 
What is more, Article III courts, once analyzing whether detainees had 
a right to a bond hearing, also began to dictate the contours of that bond 
 
 208. Taylor, supra note 206, at 345. 
 209. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.  
 210. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning that a detainee “could be entitled to an 
individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention 
became unreasonable or unjustified.”) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–86 (2001)). 
 211. See, e.g., Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2016), vacated, 890 
F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016), 
withdrawn, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018) (“The case 
before us tests the assumption upon which Demore was based, and asks whether Congress may 
employ categorical, mandatory detention for ‘the period necessary for removal proceedings’ when 
that period turns out not to be so ‘brief’ after all.”). 
 212. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1079–85 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 830 
(2018).  The Rodriguez class was subdivided into three subclasses.  Id. at 1078.  For those subject 
to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(c), the average length of detention was 427 days, 
with the longest-detained class member confined for 1,585 days (and counting).  Id. at 1079.  The 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) subclass members had “been detained for as long as 831 days, and for an average 
of 346 days each.”  Id. at 1081.  “At the time petitioners generated their report, [one 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(a) subclass member] had been detained for 1,234 days with no definite end in sight.”  Id. at 
1085.  
 213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1952) (“Any court of competent jurisdiction shall have authority 
to review or revise any determination of the Attorney General concerning detention, release on 
bond, or parole pending final decision of deportability upon a conclusive showing in habeas corpus 
proceedings that the Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be 
warranted by the particular facts and circumstances in the case of any alien to determine 
deportability.”). 
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hearing.214  This made immigration bond hearings look more like bail 
hearings for pretrial detainees.215  In some cases, Article III courts, exercising 
their equitable powers under the habeas statute, held their own bond hearings 
or simply ordered release.216  In other cases, courts closely monitored how 
immigration judges conducted the bond hearings that courts had ordered.  
This typically arose when litigants did not believe that the immigration judge 
properly followed the procedural requirements mandated by the courts.217   
Article III courts also repeatedly ignored the “entry fiction”218 that 
purported to create a constitution-free zone for those stopped at the nation’s 
borders.219  In case after case, noncitizens who were stopped at the border and 
detained pending the presentation and appeal of an asylum claim invoked the 
 
 214. For example, courts determined that the government, not the detainee, should bear the 
burden of proof at the bond hearings for which previously mandatory detainees were now eligible.  
See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. 
Ct. 1260 (2018); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011).  But see Sopo, 825 
F.3d at 1220 (holding that those detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for a prolonged period such that 
the statute should require a bond hearing do not deserve more process than those detained under 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a), who must bear the burden of proof according to regulation and Board precedent).  
Courts also decided that the standard of proof should be clear and convincing evidence.  See, e.g., 
Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “a clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof provides the appropriate level of procedural protection” in light of “the 
substantial liberty interest at stake.”).  
 215. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2000) (requiring, when a pretrial detainee is charged with certain 
enumerated offenses, that the government move for a detention hearing at which the government 
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the detainee is dangerous and that no conditions 
can ensure the safety of the community). 
 216. See, e.g., Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 476–77 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(collecting cases of district courts that held their own bond hearings pursuant to equitable habeas 
powers). 
 217. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–04 (evaluating procedures used in bond hearing mandated 
by the court’s earlier decision in Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 
2008)); Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 239–43 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting a motion 
to enforce the judgment when the immigration judge did not apply the clear and convincing burden 
of proof to the government in a court-ordered bond hearing).  
 218. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 157, at 25.  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández 
describes the origins of the entry fiction in immigration law.  See id. at 23–25.  This legal fiction 
allowed arriving migrants to land on U.S. soil, relieving steamship companies of holding them on 
ships while immigration officers vetted them using the growing list of exclusion grounds.  Id.  The 
legal fiction permitted this arrangement, but excluded the migrants from claiming any constitutional 
rights that normally would accompany presence on U.S. soil.  Id.   
 219. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The government 
first contends in these appeals that . . . the detention of excludable aliens cannot raise constitutional 
concerns because such detention ‘does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.’  We could not more 
vehemently disagree.  Excludable aliens—like all aliens—are clearly protected by the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (citation omitted); see also id. at 410 (“The fact 
that excludable aliens are entitled to less process, however, does not mean that they are not at all 
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Chi Thon Ngo 
v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Due Process Clause, claiming a constitutional right to be free from prolonged 
detention while their cases were pending.220  Such courts were careful to limit 
the Supreme Court’s 1953 holding in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex. rel. Mezei221 to 
its facts, holding that the Due Process Clause was only inapplicable because 
the detainee was ordered excluded for national security reasons.222  Thus, 
even those with the fewest statutory and constitutional rights to be free  still 
managed to convince Article III judges that the constitution required an 
individualized bond hearing when detention became unreasonably 
prolonged.223 
Finally, Article III courts began to examine the quality of the bond 
hearings that occur pursuant to the general bond statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  
Here, Article III courts repeatedly found immigration judges’ bond hearings 
constitutionally defective.  For example, courts have held that: (1) detainees 
 
 220. See, e.g., Tuser v. Rodriguez, 370 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (D.N.J. 2019); Jamal v. Whitaker, 
358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 857 (D. Minn. 2019); De Ming Wang v. Brophy, No. 17-CV-6263-FPG, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1826, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019); Perez v. Decker, No. 18-cv-5279 (VEC), 
2018 WL 3991497, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (collecting cases from the Southern District 
of New York); Ahad v. Lowe, 235 F. Supp. 3d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Maldonado v. Macias, 
150 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812 (W.D. Tex. 2015).  But see Poonjani v. Shanahan, 319 F. Supp. 3d 644, 
649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[B]ecause the immigration statutes at issue here do not authorize a bond 
hearing, Mezei dictates that due process does not require one here.”).  
 221. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).  In Mezei, the petitioner was ordered excluded under the Passport Act 
and its implementing regulations yet forced to remain detained on Ellis Island because no other 
nation would receive him.  Id. at 205–06.  The Court ruled that his continued exclusion and detention 
without a hearing did not deprive him of any statutory or constitutional right, because the 
constitution did not apply to him.  Id. at 215–16.  The Mezei decision suffered serious critique, even 
at the time, owing to the Court’s determination that the constitutional right of Due Process did not 
even apply.  See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note18, at 61; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and 
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
933, 982–84 (1995) (describing post-decision public critique and congressional efforts that 
ultimately led to the Attorney General releasing Mezei on parole); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power 
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1362, 1392 (1953). 
 222. See, e.g., Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei was 
decided in the interest of national security, against a petition whose detention was authorized under 
‘emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the Passport Act.’”) (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 
214–15); id. at 240 (“It is well-established that national security concerns affect the scope of due 
process. . . . The world remains threatening to the United States’ interests, but we are far from the 
dark climate of World War II and the Korean and Vietnamese wars.  As the Sixth Circuit held en 
banc, Mezei is limited to the national security context in which it was decided.”); see also Rosales-
Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14 (distinguishing Mezei from the case of a paroled Cuban who was 
ordered excluded by stating that “the Mezei Court explicitly grounded its decision in the special 
circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei 
presented a threat to national security”); id. at 414 (holding that Mezei was also distinguishable 
because “the Court’s implicit conclusion in Mezei is eclipsed by the conclusion drawn from the 
Salerno line of cases that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens does raise constitutional 
concerns”). 
 223. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14; Kouadio, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 239–40. 
  
1110 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1076 
 
should not be required to bear the burden of proof;224 (2) the appropriate 
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence;225 (3) immigration judges 
must consider alternatives to detention;226 (4) detainees should not suffer 
detention merely because they are unable to pay the bond set by an 
immigration judge;227 (5) judges must keep a contemporaneous record of the 
hearings;228 and (6) judges must immediately state the reasons for a bond 
denial (as opposed to writing post-hoc reasons for denial).229  In these cases, 
government arguments that Article III courts have no role to play in 
reviewing immigration judges’ and officers’ discretionary bond decisions 
have proven unconvincing.230  In fact, because detainees presented these 
arguments as procedural due process violations, it was necessary for the 
detainees to show they were prejudiced by the procedures231—and that 
 
 224. See, e.g., Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 846, 854 (2d Cir. 2020); Dubon Miranda 
v. Barr, 463 F. Supp. 3d 632, 646 (D. Md. 2020); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 263 (D. Mass. 
2019); Linares Martinez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018 WL 5023946, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17, 2018); Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass 2018). 
 225. See, e.g., Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854–55; Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 
(9th Cir. 2011); Linares Martinez, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018 WL 5023946, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 17, 2018). 
 226. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 291–92 (9th Cir. 2017); Dubon-Miranda, 
463 F. Supp. 3d 632 (D. Md. 2020); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 263, 271 (D. Mass. 2019); 
Abdi v. Nielson, 287 F. Supp. 3d 327, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 227. See Abdi, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 333.  
 228. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200. 
 229. Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1173, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 
2019) (granting a preliminary injunction for prompt bond hearings with several procedural 
protections that are currently lacking in bond hearings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for a 
class of asylum-seekers who recently entered the United States and passed a credible fear interview). 
 230. See, e.g., Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 987 (“[8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)] does not, however, preclude 
‘habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.’ . . . ’[C]laims that the 
discretionary [bond] process itself was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in federal court on 
habeas because they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.’” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1196, 
1202)) (citations omitted) (alterations in original); Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202 (“Like § 1226(e), 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) restricts jurisdiction only with respect to the executive’s exercise of discretion.  
It does not limit habeas jurisdiction over questions of law, . . . including ‘application of law to 
undisputed facts, sometimes referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.’” (quoting Ramadan v. 
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007))) (citations omitted); Linares Martinez, 2018 WL 
5023946, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) (“One of [the government’s] arguments—that the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to review Linares’s detention . . . —barely warrants scrutiny.  It is well established 
that Section 1226(e) . . . does not preclude judicial review of ‘[c]laims of constitutional infirmity in 
the procedures followed at a bond hearing.’” (quoting Bogle v. DuBois, 236 F. Supp. 3d 820, 822 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)). 
 231. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205; Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, 274 F. Supp. 3d 11, 
13–15 (D. Mass 2017) (declining to reach the issue of whether a misallocated burden of proof 
violated the detainee’s due process rights because the detainee was not prejudiced by the error). 
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prejudice inquiry requires courts to analyze whether the result could have 
been different with the proper procedures.232 
D. COVID-19 Cases 
When the COVID-19 pandemic caused worldwide closures, stay-at-
home orders, and health-expert-mandated social distancing, immigrant 
advocates wondered what would happen to immigration detainees.233  
Immigration detention sites were a tinderbox for spreading the virus,234 with 
detainees sharing bedrooms, bathrooms, and dining spaces, while lacking 
protective equipment or sanitizer.  Detainees were further exposed to 
numerous corrections staff.235  
Again, Article III courts played an important role in monitoring the right 
to liberty in these exigent circumstances.  In one case, a federal district court 
ordered U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to conduct new 
custody determinations for all of its detainees with risk factors that would 
increase the detainees’ risk of serious illness or death if infected by COVID-
19.236  In other cases, federal courts granted injunctive relief, ordering ICE to 
release certain vulnerable detainees237 or depopulate its jails.238  
 
 232. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205 (holding that the court applied the incorrect standard of proof 
in a bond hearing, and that “the standard of proof could well have affected the outcome.”); Doe v. 
Tompkins, No. 18-12266-PBS, 2019 WL 8437191, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2019) (holding that 
placing the burden of proof on a detainee violated due process rights and that a different burden 
allocation could have impacted the outcome). 
 233. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández & Carlos Moctezuma García, Close Immigration 
Prisons Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/ 
opinion/coronavirus-immigration-prisons.html. 
 234. See Catherine E. Shoichet, Doctors Warn of ‘Tinderbox Scenario’ if Coronavirus Spreads 
in ICE Detention, CNN (Mar. 20, 2020, 8:21 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/20/health/doctors-ice-detention-coronavirus/index.html. 
 235. See Decl. of Robert B. Greifinger, MD, Augusto v. Moniz, No. 1:20-cv-10685-ADB, Docket 
No. 36 (D. Mass 2020) (on file with author). 
 236. See Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 750 (C.D. Cal. 2020). 
 237. See, e.g., Coreas v. Bounds, 458 F. Supp. 3d 352, 360–61 (D. Md. 2020); Jeferson V.G. v. 
Decker, No. 20-3644 (KM), 2020 WL 1873018, *3–9 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2020); Thakker v. Doll, 451 
F. Supp. 3d 358, 365, 367, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Basank v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 205, 213, 215 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) (ordering 
sua sponte release of a noncitizen whose petition for review was pending before the court of appeals 
“[i]n light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will 
especially impact immigration detention centers”).  But see Dawson v. Asher, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 
1048–49 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (denying a temporary restraining order seeking release of medically 
vulnerable immigration detainees). 
 238. See, e.g., Roman v. Wolf, No. EDCV 20-00768 TJH (PVCx), 2020 WL 1952656, *9–12 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020); see also Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (D. Mass. 2020) 
(ordering ICE to test all detainees and staff at one detention facility and to not admit any more 
immigration detainees to that facility). 
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Article III courts also began to conduct their own bail hearings for 
immigration detainees, taking the liberty decisions away from ICE officers 
and immigration judges.  A little-known doctrine permits Article III courts to 
release a detainee on bail if there are extraordinary circumstances that make 
the granting of bail necessary to make habeas effective.239  In several cases, 
federal courts decided bail for immigration detainees using this doctrine.240  
In some cases, the detainee sought an immigration court bond hearing in the 
underlying habeas corpus petition, but it was unclear when that bond hearing 
would happen due to immigration court delays caused by the pandemic.241  
The Article III courts reasoned that the remedy sought by the habeas 
petition—a bond hearing—would be rendered ineffective if the detainee was 
not immediately released, since more time in custody meant greater 
likelihood of infection, and possibly death, before an immigration court bond 
hearing.242  Immigration detainees also sought release as a remedy to an 
overpopulated detention center, arguing that their forced communal living in 
a pandemic amounted to a due process violation.243  While courts sorted out 
these substantial legal claims, they also considered bail for detainees, again 
so that the remedy the detainees sought would not be rendered ineffective if 
the detainees died from the virus before the case could be resolved in court.244 
These cases demonstrate that the federal courts, not immigration judges, 
became the guardians of freedom for immigration detainees when accessing 
freedom was crucial for their physical safety.  As one district court stated:  
Our Constitution and laws apply equally to the most vulnerable among 
us, particularly when matters of public health are at issue.  This is true even 
for those who have lost a measure of their freedom.  If we are to remain the 
civilized society we hold ourselves out to be, it would be heartless and 
inhumane not to recognize Petitioners’ plight.  And so we will act.245   
The global pandemic exposed to the public the many flaws in the U.S. 
immigration detention system, as there were over 12,000 reported virus cases 
 
 239. See Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 240. See, e.g., Yanes v. Martin, 464 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (D.R.I. 2020); Gomes v. U.S. Dep’t 
Homeland Sec., 460 F. Supp. 3d 132, 156 (D.N.H. 2020); Savino, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 322; Avendaño 
Hernandez v. Decker, 450 F. Supp. 3d 443, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Arana v. Barr, No. 19cv7924 
(PGG) (DF), 2020 WL 1502039, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 2020); Coronel v. Decker, 449 F. 
Supp. 3d 274, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 241. See, e.g., Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 280, 286; Arana, No. 19cv7924 (PGG) (DF), 2020 
WL 1502039, at *1. 
 242. Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 283.  
 243. See, e.g., Savino, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 327–31; Avendaño Hernandez, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 447; 
Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 280, 285–87.  
 244. Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 287.  
 245. Thakker v. Doll, 451 F. Supp. 3d 358, 372 (M.D. Pa. 2020).  
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in ICE detention.246 One solution was for Article III courts to step in and 
make liberty decisions, taking those away from ICE prosecutors and 
immigration judges.  
E. Federal Courts Applying a Familiar Map 
These examples of federal court involvement in protecting immigration 
detainees’ rights demonstrate that federal courts have played a significant 
role in custody decisions, even in the face of statutes attempting to limit their 
jurisdiction.  Why?  The best explanation, offered by historians studying 
judicial involvement in immigration detention and Chinese exclusion, is that 
Article III courts have a familiar map onto which they must make sense of an 
immigration case.247  For example, during the Chinese exclusion period, 
lower federal judges hearing the cases harbored their own anti-Chinese 
biases, and popular opinion was anti-Chinese.248  Yet, the judges applied 
settled judicial doctrines such as the presumption of freedom and certain 
evidentiary doctrines, knowing that they would suffer significant critique.249  
Reflecting on the Red Scare, when courts considered the question of 
indefinite detention for communists who could not be deported, Daniel 
Wilsher describes how some judges still applied “the ‘old map’ of habeas 
corpus” and the presumption of freedom in the new world of alien controls, 
although these courts struggled with the decisions.250  
Courts have honored the common law presumption of freedom, often 
releasing immigration detainees on bail while they fought against exclusion 
or deportation, even though this limited form of authorization overrode 
Congress’ decision to exclude or deport such a person.251  The political 
branches’ plenary power over deportation and exclusion decisions, which 
told judges to stay out of the decisions, was in conflict with the common law 
presumption of freedom—if detention was viewed as a necessary part of that 
exclusion and deportation power.252  The solution for many judges was to 
 
 246. Isabel Niu, Emily Rhyne, and Aaron Byrd, How ICE’s Mishandling of Covid-19 Fueled 
Outbreaks Around the Country, The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000007707896/immigration-detention-covid.html. 
 247. See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note 18, at 150; SALYER, supra note 158, at xvi. 
 248. See SALYER, supra note 158, at xvi, 18, 21. 
 249. See id. (discussing federal judges’ willingness to believe Chinese witnesses and documents 
because the government frequently could not prove that they were not credible or fraudulent); see 
also WILSHER, supra note 18, at 22 (describing a judge’s decision to limit detention post-exclusion 
for a Chinese person whose ship had already departed as a “principled solution showing 
considerable fortitude, given the hostile political environment.”). 
 250. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 33–34. 
 251. See infra Part II; WILSHER, supra note 18, at xx. 
 252. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6–8. 
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view detention as a separate legal issue.253  Detention could even be viewed 
as a source of additional rights.254 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always vindicated the rights of 
immigration detainees.  Perhaps the most damaging passage, repeated by the 
Supreme Court during the Chinese Exclusion Era, the Cold War, and the 
more recent War on Terror, is the statement that “[d]etention is necessarily a 
part of this deportation procedure.”255  This doctrinal intertwining of 
detention with the exclusion and deportation powers suggests that the 
political branches’ power over immigration detention is also plenary.256  Yet, 
a laser focus on these statements by the Supreme Court neglects the role that 
lower federal courts have played in upholding the presumption of freedom 
for immigration detainees.257  Lower courts, when asked to evaluate the 
 
 253. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 551 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“A power to put in jail 
because dangerous cannot be derived from a power to deport.”); Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. 
Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1015 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (critiquing as an “unwarranted 
[judicial] leap” the majority’s “moving from the uncontroverted propositions that the political 
branches have plenary authority over deciding whom to admit into the country and that such political 
decisions are largely immune from judicial review, to the unsupportable conclusion that how it treats 
those whom it detains while the deportation process is underway is likewise beyond judicial 
review”); Cole, supra note 84, at 1038 (arguing that defenders of unchecked detention as part of the 
deportation process “have confused the power to deport with the power to detain.”).  
 254. Jonathan Simon explains that detention provides additional rights.  See Simon, supra note 
163, at 600.  Otherwise, the U.S. government would not have resorted to the extraordinary policy 
of interdicting Haitian boats in the 1990s; the policy aimed to prevent the migrants from arriving on 
U.S. territory, after which their detention in a U.S. jail would permit them to seek relief in federal 
court.  Id.   
 255. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting Carlson, 342 U.S. at538) (alteration in 
original); see, e.g., id. at 523 (“[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation 
proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.  As we said more than a 
century ago, deportation proceedings ‘would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody 
pending the inquiry into their true character.’” (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 
235 (1896))); Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538 (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation 
procedure.  Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United 
States during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”). 
 256. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6. 
 257. See SALYER, supra note 158, at xv (discussing the intervention by federal district courts in 
San Francisco in response to the Chinese Exclusion Acts, where these judges “played a more active 
role, at least initially, a fact missed by legal scholars, perhaps because they have focused on the 
Supreme Court and East Coast European immigrants.”).  As an example of scholarship that has 
focused mainly on the Supreme Court, Lenni Benson has argued that the judiciary repeatedly has 
allowed immigration authorities to expand the use of immigration detention.  Lenni B. Benson, As 
Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 15 (2010).  
Summarizing the Supreme Court’s doctrine of immigration exceptionalism during the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts and Red Scare, she observes that the Court has refused to hold immigration detention 
to be an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.  Id. at 17, 21–37.  The only time the Court got close, 
she argues, was in its 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, yet the Court did not reach the 
constitutional question, thus not going far enough to recognize constitutional rights of immigration 
detainees.  Id. at 15–16. 
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constitutionality of immigration detention in various contexts, have 
repeatedly invoked the rights-granting language of Zadvydas and 
distinguished Demore,258 demonstrating their willingness to guard the right 
to physical liberty, even when the person in front of the court is not a citizen 
or facing criminal charges.259  In fact, that lower federal courts have 
vindicated immigration detainees’ rights, in spite of such harsh statements by 
the Supreme Court and Congressional language that repeatedly attempts to 
limit their jurisdiction, only suggests that the federal judiciary will continue 
to play an active role in monitoring immigration detention. 
Of course, one response that could be expected from the Supreme Court 
is a reversion to the harshest version of the plenary power.  This occurred 
with the recent decision in DHS v. Thuraissigiam,260 where the Court 
affirmed the Mezei rule that arriving aliens have no due process rights, and 
even extended the rule to those who were physically within a U.S. border, 
although only twenty-five yards inside of the border.261  As David Martin 
warned decades ago:  
Due process . . . threatens to become the kudzu vine of 
constitutional law: allow it to take root and it soon takes over the 
whole hillside . . . .  [T]he Court often seems a lonely and perhaps 
unconvincing machete-wielder, cutting back on the luxuriant 
growth that appears continually to spring forth in the lower courts.  
If the Court feels embattled in these efforts, the Knauff-Mezei 
doctrine will appear increasingly attractive.262 
One of the most instructive opinions about the lower courts’ willingness 
to distinguish the harshest Supreme Court cases on immigration detention 
came in 2015 from the Ninth Circuit.  In Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriquez 
 
 258. See, e.g., Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 691 (D. Mass 2018) (“Freedom 
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 
(2001))); id. at 692 (“But Demore is not applicable here because it involved criminal aliens subject 
to mandatory detention.  In contrast, this case involves a different statutory section, § 1226(a), which 
permits release of non-criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings.  The Supreme Court has 
not yet determined what process is due when an immigration judge does hold an individualized 
bond hearing for non-criminal aliens.”); Linares Martinez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018 
WL 5023946, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 3d 698, 703–06 
(E.D. Va. 2018). 
 259. See, e.g., Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We are not persuaded by 
the government’s argument that we should deviate from this principle and apply the lower 
preponderance of the evidence standard because the liberty interest at stake here is less than for 
people subject to an initial finding of removal or other types of civil commitment.”). 
 260. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). 
 261. Id. at 1981–83. 
 262. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political 
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 188–89 (1983). 
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III),263 the court interpreted immigration statutes that purported to mandate 
immigration detention without a bond hearing. 264  The court interpreted the 
statutes to provide a bond hearing every six months, in order to avoid the 
constitutional problems that the statutes would otherwise present.265  The 
court reviewed key Supreme Court decisions on immigration detention and 
wrote: 
Early cases [such as Carlson and Wong Wing v. United States266] 
upholding immigration detention policies were a product of their 
time . . . . Yet even these cases recognized some limits on 
detention of non-citizens pending removal.  Such detention may 
not be punitive . . . and it must be supported by a legitimate 
regulatory purpose.  Under these principles, the Court authorized 
the ‘detention or temporary confinement’ of Chinese-born non-
citizens ‘pending the inquiry into their true character, and while 
arrangements were being made for their deportation.’ . . . 
Similarly, the Court approved detention of communists to limit 
their ‘opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency 
of deportation proceedings.’ . . . The Court recognized, however, 
that ‘purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens 
subject to deportation.’ . . . Rather, if the Attorney General wished 
to exercise his discretion to deny bail, he was required to do so at 
a hearing, the results of which were subject to judicial review.267   
On review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court, in its 
2018 decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez,268 did not opine on the 
constitutionality of prolonged immigration detention.  The Jennings majority 
held that the lower court was wrong to engage in statutory interpretation to 
find such a right to a bond hearing and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to 
 
 263. 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez III), rev’d and rem’d, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 
S. Ct. 830 (2018)). 
 264. Id. at 1076.  
 265. Id. 
 266. The court here refers to Carlson v. Landon, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a Congressional delegation of bail decisions to an executive branch official.  342 U.S. 524, 542–
44 (1952).  The court also refers to Wong Wing, in which the Court invalidated the portion of the 
1892 Geary Act that required a year at hard labor prior to the deportation of a Chinese national, 
deeming it punishment that was deserving of the procedural protections of a criminal trial.  163 U.S. 
228, 234–35 (1896).  However, in dicta, the Court wrote that detention was a valid part of the 
deportation process.  Id. at 235 (“We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part 
of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would 
be valid.  Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in 
custody pending the inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being made for 
their deportation.”). 
 267. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1076.  
 268. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
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determine the constitutional issue.269  In his dissent, Justice Breyer reasoned 
that prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing violated the 
Due Process Clause.270  Time will tell how a majority of the Supreme Court 
will assess the constitutional right to a bond hearing during removal 
proceedings when detention has become prolonged; the only current 
Supreme Court justice’s opinion on this issue is Justice Breyer’s Jennings 
dissent.  
This Part, together with Part I, demonstrates the very different decision-
making maps used by Article III judges and immigration judges.  Article III 
courts frequently interpret the U.S. constitution; this provides an explanation 
for why the presumption of freedom often has overridden immigration law’s 
plenary power.271  Immigration judges, on the other hand, do not interpret the 
constitution.272  They spend much of their time deciding applications for 
relief from removal, where the applicant bears the burden of proof273 and 
typically must beg for a favorable exercise of discretion.274  When an 
immigration judge conducts a bond hearing, the expectation is also that the 
detainee must beg for mercy.275  Yet, liberty should be for the detainee to 
take, not beg for.276  To make matters worse, immigration judges work for a 
law enforcement agency that has long had a public agenda of using detention 
for social control and deterring future border crossers.277  Immigration judges 
have been sent the message that they rule against the government at their own 
 
 269. Id. at 834–836. 
 270. Id. at 861–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 271. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6–8; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) 
(“But that power [the plenary power,] is subject to important constitutional limitations.”).  
 272. See Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration 
judge and [the BIA] lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the 
regulations.”).  But cf. Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 485, 491 (2018) (arguing that federal agencies like the Board of Immigration Appeals have 
the power to decide constitutional issues and should utilize this power). 
 273. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). 
 274. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and 
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997).  
 275. This is particularly so because the Board has ruled that the detainee bears the burden of 
proof in a bond hearing.  See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006); see also Holper, 
Beast of Burden, supra note 20.  
 276. See Abira Ashfaq, We Have Given Them This Power: Reflections of an Immigration 
Attorney, NEW POLITICS 66, 67 (Summer 2004); see also Gilman, supra note 20, at 175 (critiquing 
immigration bond hearings because they begin with a default presumption of detention instead of 
liberty). 
 277. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 239–40 (2019); 
Mark Noferi, Mandatory Immigration Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of 
Dangerousness, in IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: STUDIES ON 
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME 217 (Maria João Guia, Robert Koulish & Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 
2016); Margaret H. Taylor, Symbolic Detention, 20 DEF. ALIEN 153, 154–55 (1997). 
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peril, or at the risk of being overruled by a law enforcement official.278  It is 
unsurprising, therefore, when an immigration judge chooses a bond outcome 
that favors detention over freedom. 
III. PROPOSAL 
The involvement of federal judges described in Part II has only come 
when a detainee is savvy enough to file a habeas corpus petition pro se, or 
lucky enough to have counsel who would bring the custody decision to an 
Article III court.  What would the world of immigration detention look like 
if all of those custody decisions went straight to federal district court, with 
federal magistrate judges deciding whether a detainee should remain in 
detention during their removal proceedings?  Is it possible to dream up a 
world where imitation judges have no role to play in deciding detention 
matters, and only decide removability and relief from removal?   
In this Part, I propose legislation that brings every immigration detainee 
before a federal district court for a review of detention.  More concretely, I 
propose that magistrate judges, with review by Article III district judges, 
conduct custody hearings using the procedures of the Bail Reform Act.  
Before describing the proposed procedures, I start with a theoretical defense 
of this proposal.  
A. Detention is Different 
To put the theoretical defense of this proposal simply, detention is 
different from other decisions that immigration judges currently make.  
Several scholars have argued that immigration detention itself should be 
viewed as punishment, regardless of whether the removal proceedings are 
deemed civil.279  Jonathan Simon describes how the new migrants arriving in 
the 1980s were deemed “nonwhite by United States racial stereotypes;” the 
Mariel Cubans were “viciously and largely inaccurately stamped from the 
start with the stigma of dangerousness” and the Haitians were 
“overwhelmingly black and mostly poor,” with the added stigma of carrying 
AIDS.280  The government’s response to the arrival of masses of dangerous, 
 
 278. See supra Part I. 
 279. See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1352 (“Immigration imprisonment has, in 
essence, taken on the same legal character as the immigration process and outcome that justify its 
existence: It is civil confinement because it is part of a civil proceeding to determine whether a civil 
sanction will be meted out.”).  García Hernández has also written that immigration detention should 
be abolished, because in its current state it is morally indefensible due to the high number of people 
of color in detention.  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 245, 251, 270 (2017). 
 280. Simon, supra note 163, at 590–600. 
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dependent, and possibly disease-carrying migrants was social control through 
detention.281  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues that Congress had 
a punitive purpose in the expansion and use of immigration detention, which 
coincided with the War on Drugs in the 1980s; the legislative intent behind 
immigration detention was to stigmatize and penalize those who engage in 
drug activity. 282  Because the new, nonwhite migrants were stereotyped as 
drug dealers, the governmental response was incapacitation through 
detention.283  Daniel Wilsher describes how “[d]etention has increasingly 
become unstuck from its ostensible function of selecting who to admit or 
enforcing the speedy and efficient physical return of unwanted immigrants” 
and now has “mutated into a more general form of executive and political 
control over unauthorized aliens.”284  Emily Ryo’s empirical work has 
studied the role of immigration judges in deciding bond, where the goal of 
protecting the public “implicates one of the primary objectives of criminal 
punishment—incapacitation.”285  She has also studied immigrant detainees’ 
perceptions of the system and found a central belief that immigration 
detention is an act of penal confinement, not “civil,” as it has been 
classified.286 
Because immigration detention is punishment, there are two possible 
solutions: (1) entrench it in criminal procedure; or (2) distance it from its 
punitive past, thus rendering it a truly “civil” detention system, where 
detention is the exception and not the norm.287  The additional procedural 
protections in bond hearings are coming slowly but surely, thanks to Article 
III courts’ involvement.288  But there is more that can be done, and I propose 
 
 281. See id. at 600–04. 
 282. García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1350. 
 283. See id. at 1360. 
 284. Wilsher, supra note 18, at xxii–xxiii; see also Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation 
Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1506 (2011) (describing how the criminal and immigration detention 
systems are significantly merged, how the lengths of immigration detention have become prolonged, 
and how the detention often takes place in the same facilities, so that “the distinction between the 
two forms of incarceration may depend for the most part on the intention of the government”). 
 285. Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117, 
119 (2016). 
 286. Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
999, 1024–25 (2017). 
 287. García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1350–51; see also Mark Noferi, Making Civil 
Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J. 
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 533, 533–34 (2014) (offering prescriptive framework for a “‘truly civil’ 
immigration detention” system, which includes a comparison to the civil commitment of sex 
offenders). 
 288. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017); Abdi v. Nielson, 287 
F. Supp. 3d 327, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. 
Mass 2018). 
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as a solution for every immigration detainee a bail hearing conducted by a 
magistrate judge whose judgment is subject to review by a district court 
judge.  Since immigration detention is punishment, and the United States 
values and the Constitution protects the physical liberty of a human being, 
our laws should assign these decisions to an independent judge. 
Scholars such as Alex Aleinikoff and Lenni Benson have proposed that 
Congress restore meaningful judicial review of ordinary detention decisions 
and discretion to immigration judges in detention decisions.289  While 
restoring federal court review of discretionary detention decisions would be 
beneficial, relying on habeas corpus review is insufficient to challenge the 
federal government’s overuse of immigration detention.290  Giving discretion 
to immigration judges does little to fix the immigration detention system, 
when such judges cannot exercise their judgment in a truly independent 
manner.291  As Denise Gilman writes, “[r]eview of detention decisions by an 
independent authority is a critical safeguard of liberty.”292  
The problem of immigration judges lacking independence and yet 
making these key liberty decisions is similar to elected judges deciding bail 
in the pretrial criminal detention context.293  Elected state court judges are 
likely to err on the side of denying bail or setting high bail because they are 
“wary of bearing public responsibility for crimes that go unpunished—and 
new crimes that are committed—because of an erroneous decision to release 
defendants prior to trial.”294  In contrast, there is very little in the form of 
public accolades for releasing a defendant who does not commit any crimes 
and attends all hearings.295  Like immigration judges, state court judges risk 
 
 289. Benson, supra note 257, at 54 (arguing that the “best and most long lasting changes would 
of course, come from Congress limiting the use of detention and putting strict, clear controls on the 
agency authority to use detention” and that “Congress should restore discretion in the detention 
decisions and allow both immigration judges and the federal courts to test and review detention 
decisions”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (“Zadvydas, for all its Warren Court-like 
rulemaking, takes no steps toward ensuring what is most needed in the immigration detention 
system: meaningful judicial review of ordinary detention decisions.”); see also Silva, supra note 20, 
at 262–63 (arguing for de novo review of immigration detention decisions by a federal court).  
 290. See infra Part III.D. 
 291. See supra Part I. 
 292. Gilman, supra note 20, at 188 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)).  
See also Silva, supra note 20, at 262–64 (discussing immigration judges’ lack of independence as a 
reason why federal courts should engage in de novo review of immigration detention decisions). 
 293. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 422 (2016). 
 294. Id.  Wiseman also writes that elected judges may additionally “face pressure from a locally 
powerful bail lobby” to set high bails.  Id.  This critique may apply to immigration judges, although 
the policies described in Part I.B., supra, err on the side of no bond and thus would not favor any 
immigration bond companies.   
 295. Id. at 428. 
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losing their jobs if they rule too often in favor of release.296  This has caused 
scholars to propose alternatives to such highly discretionary decision-making 
about liberty by a non-independent judge.297 
For decades, scholars, congressional committees, practicing lawyers, 
and judges have argued that administrative law judges or an Article I court 
should decide immigration cases.298  Yet I argue that for detention decisions, 
this fix simply does not go far enough.  ALJs, although more protected from 
removal than immigration judges, still do not have structural 
independence;299 they cannot, after all, overrule a decision by the executive 
branch.300  Their relative independence has even been called into question by 
a 2018 Executive Order regarding the terms of their employment,301 and a 
leaked Solicitor General memorandum defining “good cause” for removal to 
include failure to “perform adequately or to follow agency policies, 
procedures, or instructions.”302  Article I courts have suffered similar 
 
 296. See id. at 428–29. 
 297. See, e.g., id. at 443–77 (proposing use of actuarial risk assessment tools instead of judicial 
discretion in bail decisions); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, 
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1297, 1363–66 (2012) (proposing 
a “bail jury” to advise judges in making pretrial decisions); Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, 
Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 554–55 (2012) (exploring criteria that would more 
accurately predict defendant dangerousness and suggesting that counties implement these models 
to guide judges); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 
995–96 (1965) (proposing elimination of money bail). 
 298. See supra note 4. 
 299. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2006).  Moliterno discusses how administrative law judges are meant to be 
impartial (fair-minded, neutral in their decision making), but not structurally independent in the 
same way as an Article III court.  Id. at 1200–20.   
 300. Id. at 1209; see also Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 
61–62 (1979). 
 301. In response to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC, a July 2018 Executive 
Order changed the appointments process for ALJs, whose appointment processes will now be 
controlled by agency heads, instead of the less political Office of Personnel Management.  Exec. 
Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 
32,755 (July 10, 2018).  Critics have raised concerns that this will lead to more political hiring of 
ALJs, reflecting the same concerns over political hiring for immigration judges.  Eric Yoder, Trump 
Moves to Shield Administrative Law Judge Decisions in Wake of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST 
(July 10, 2018 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/ 
2018/07/10/trump-moves-to-shield-administrative-law-judge-decisions-in-wake-of-high-court-
ruling/?utm_term=.8a195a289e49; Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump 
Administration Blocked Her over Politics, CNN POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicant-says-trump-
administration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html. The Biden administration has continued this 
Trump administration policy, facilitating the political hiring and firing of ALJs. See Davidson, 
supra note 78. 
 302. Memorandum from Solicitor General to Agency General Counsels on Guidance on 
Administrative Law Judges after Lucia v. SEC 9, https://static.reuters.com/ 
resources/media/editorial/20180723/ALJ—SGMEMO.pdf.  As Paul Verkuil has noted, the Solicitor 
  
1122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:1076 
 
critiques about their independence.303  Also, Article I courts are subject to the 
“Darwinian process by which agencies compete for funding.” 304  An 
independent immigration adjudicative agency would likely fare much worse 
in obtaining funding than other similar agencies that deal with more popular 
causes such as veteran’s benefits or tax adjudication.305 
B. Adopting the Bail Reform Act Procedures 
To envision what these procedures would look like, one need not assign 
a brand new task to Article III courts.  Rather, magistrate judges already 
regularly decide whether a detainee with pending criminal charges is a danger 
or flight risk—which is the same inquiry immigration judges undertake when 
deciding bond.  The procedures for such hearings in federal court, however, 
are considerably more protective of a pretrial detainee’s rights than the 
current procedures provided by the immigration statutes and regulations.306  
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”)307 created a procedure whereby 
prosecutors can ask for detention hearings when the case involves certain 
crimes that indicate a defendant’s dangerousness, even though the defendant 
has yet to be tried for that offense.308  The 1984 BRA also created rebuttable 
 
General’s memo expresses only litigation positions; however, the Executive Order took legal 
actions to “dramatically expand executive control over administrative adjudicators.”).  Paul R. 
Verkuil, Presidential Administration, the Appointment of ALJs and the Future of For Cause 
Protection, CSAS Working Paper 20-07, at 3 (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2020/02/Verkuil-Presidential-
Administration-the-Appointment-of-ALJs.pdf.  
 303. See Family, supra note 105, at 549–50 (summarizing scholarly critiques of independence 
of Article I courts such as the Tax Court and Veterans Court). 
 304. Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third 
Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1853 
(2010). 
 305. Id. at 1854; AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N IMMIGR., supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 306. See Gilman, supra note 20, at 190–95 (comparing pretrial detention and immigration 
custody redetermination procedures); Cole, supra note 20, at 719–20 (recommending that Congress 
adopt procedures similar to the Bail Reform Act for immigration detainees); Matter of De La Cruz, 
20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 352–61 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting) (interpreting the 
former immigration detention statute governing bond hearings for those convicted of certain crimes 
and advocating for the Board to interpret the provision in accordance with the Bail Reform Act 
because of the parallels in the statutory language). 
 307. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151). 
 308. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 21–22, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.3182, 
3204–05.  There were previous versions of the BRA that permitted such a hearing after a conviction, 
while the defendant was appealing the case.  The 1984 BRA was the first federal statute to permit 
pretrial detention based on dangerousness.  See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: 
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 376–77 (1970).  It was 
modeled after the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970.  See 
id. at 371 n.1.  Scholars disputed how closely the BRA tracked the D.C. statute because the BRA 
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presumptions of dangerousness when defendants are charged with certain 
enumerated crimes,309 effectively shifting the burden of production from the 
government to the defendant.310  The judicial officer (typically a magistrate 
judge)311 must determine whether the defendant is a danger to the community 
or flight risk, and whether any condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial or the safety of the 
community.312  Either party can request de novo review by a district court 
judge,313 and can appeal the decision to the court of appeals in their respective 
circuit.314  As described by the Supreme Court, which upheld the BRA against 
a constitutional challenge,315 “[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing, the 
Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing 
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the 
community or any person.”316 
Asking a magistrate judge to assess danger to the community is no 
different than an immigration judge deciding dangerousness in a bond 
hearing.  Flight risk may be different.317  Yet, when one considers the way 
immigration judges currently assess flight risk,318 the myriad factors bear a 
 
had fewer procedural protections.  Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and 
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 347 (1990).  
 309. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).  The rebuttable presumptions have been amended over the years to 
include several offenses; today, offenses involving drug trafficking, terrorism, carrying a firearm in 
the commission of a crime of violence, and offenses involving minor victims (from sexual abuse to 
offenses involving child pornography) all create the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness.  Id.   
 310. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1985), abrogated, United 
States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990) (in construing the BRA of 1984, determining that 
“Congress did not intend to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant but intended to impose 
only a burden of production”); United States v. Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1237 (7th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Carbone, 793 F.2d 559, 560 
(3d Cir. 1986). 
 311. See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 27–28 
(updated Oct. 2016), https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper-
2016-pdf-2.pdf (describing magistrates’ duties, which include presiding over bail and detention 
hearings). 
 312. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). 
 313. 18 U.S.C. § 3145. 
 314. The review of the district court’s decision is de novo, giving deference to the district court’s 
determination.  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 816 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 315. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
 316. Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).  The Court held that the procedural protections 
available under the BRA “are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination.”  
Id. at 751.  These procedures included the rights to court-appointed counsel,  present witnesses, 
cross-examine the government’s witnesses, written findings of fact, immediate appellate review, 
and the enumeration of several statutory factors that the judicial officer must consider.  Id. at 751–
52. 
 317. See Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 127. 
 318. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (instructing immigration judges 
in bond hearings to consider fixed address, length of residence, family ties, employment history, 
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striking resemblance to the factors used in criminal cases.319  With respect to 
the availability of relief from removal, magistrate judges would be asked to 
opine on whether a detainee presents a prima facie asylum case, for 
example.320  While this might seem like a daunting task, it is similar to the 
inquiry that federal courts already make when a detainee argues that 
prolonged mandatory detention is unconstitutional; courts there regularly 
evaluate whether the detainee is likely to be ordered removed.321  Also, most 
immigration judges likely do not have time to engage with the merits of relief 
in bond hearings, given that the purpose of a bond hearing is not to evaluate 
the merits of the case.322  Indeed, the Immigration Judge Benchbook, which 
was in use for several years, does not even list relief from removal as one of 
the flight risk factors.323   
What about decisions on whether someone is subject to mandatory 
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)?  Under the BRA, a magistrate judge 
relies on the fact of an indictment for one of the enumerated crimes to allow 
 
record of appearance in court, criminal record, history of immigration violations, attempts to flee 
authorities, manner of entry into the United States, and possibility of success on the merits of 
application for relief). 
 319. Denise Gilman has detailed how immigration bond determinations have borrowed heavily 
from pretrial bail law, which she refers to as “selective borrowing” because the procedural 
protections of the pretrial bail system do not apply, and the criminal custody system is moving away 
from a system that is overly focused on money bonds.  Gilman, supra note 20, at 195–203; see also 
id. at 201 (“[I]t is as if news of these developments [(eliminating the use of money bonds in the 
criminal pretrial detention context)] has not even reached the immigration detention system, 
although many of the same problems with monetary bond identified in the criminal pretrial system 
apply in immigration cases.”). 
 320. See Chase, supra note 126 (observing, from the view point of a former immigration judge, 
that the important inquiry for flight risk is not whether the applicant will win the case, but whether 
the applicant has a strong enough case that they will have an incentive to return to court). 
 321. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 500 (1st Cir. 2016); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 
3d 698, 707 (E.D.Va. 2018). 
 322. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2020) (providing that bond hearings and removal hearings are 
separate); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member, 
concurring and dissenting) (“The underlying purpose of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)] is not to limit the 
information an Immigration Judge may consider in redetermining bond, but to ensure that evidence 
presented in the far more informal bond hearing does not taint the ultimate adjudication of the 
charges of removability.”); Ashfaq, supra note 276, at 67 (recounting a story of an immigration 
judge who critiqued a detainee’s attorney for taking too much time developing the record for the 
merits hearing during a bond hearing). 
 323. See CHARLES A. WIEGAND, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: FUNDAMENTALS OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW, BOND AND CUSTODY HEARINGS 15–16, https://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/archived-resources (listing as significant factors in bond determinations: fixed address, length 
of residence in the United States, family ties, particularly those that can confer immigration status, 
employment history, immigration history, attempts to evade authorities, prior court appearances, 
and criminal record).  Although the Benchbook is archived as of 2017 and no longer updated, it is 
an example of how immigration judges were instructed for many years to conduct bond hearings.  
See Matthew Hoppock, Here is the Current Immigration Judge Bench Book (Sort Of) (July 3, 2017), 
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/immigration-judge-bench-book/. 
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a prosecutor to present dangerousness arguments;324 otherwise, only the 
traditional bail assessment of flight risk may be considered.325  As part of my 
proposal, I join the chorus of scholars critiquing the mandatory detention 
statute and believe that any pretrial detention should involve a judge 
reviewing the individual facts of a detainee’s case to determine whether 
detention is necessary to further a compelling government interest, such as 
protecting the community or ensuring that a detainee will not flee.326 
Yet Congress need not entirely jettison 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); instead, it 
can convert the enumerated offenses of Section 1226(c) into bases under 
which an immigration prosecutor could request a dangerousness hearing, as 
in the criminal pretrial detention context.327  It would then be necessary for 
Congress to evaluate which offenses truly render a person presumptively 
dangerous and thus subject to a detention hearing.328  It would also be 
necessary to remedy who is reviewing such charging decisions for probable 
cause, involving a magistrate judge in that decision as well329 because in the 
immigration detention system, a finding that a person is deportable for one 
of the criminal grounds of deportability is made by an immigration judge.  
Finally, such a probable cause determination would have to be made 
expeditiously, as the immigration system currently has no requirement that a 
neutral magistrate promptly review the charge for probable cause in order to 
continue pretrial detention.330 
 
 324. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). 
 325. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of 
bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring 
the presence of that defendant.”). 
 326. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 
45 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 604 (2010) (arguing that the current framework 
for mandatory detention is unfair and inefficient); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: 
Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 149, 150 (2004); Cole, supra 
note 84, at 1006–07; Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and 
Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1999). 
 327. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). 
 328. Margaret Taylor has argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) involved none of the careful 
Congressional study and deliberation that the Supreme Court in Demore attributed to it.  See  Taylor, 
supra note 206, at 343.  Today, many would agree that the categories of presumptive dangerousness 
in both 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the BRA stemmed from of the War on Drugs and “Severity 
Revolution,” and should be reevaluated.  See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1360; Teresa 
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 109–11 (2005); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining 
America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001); Joseph E. Kennedy, 
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 
829, 832–33 (2000). 
 329. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1277. 
 330. See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see also Kagan, supra note 20, at 133 (arguing that immigration detainees 
have a right under the Fourth Amendment to receive prompt review of charges of immigration law 
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To more closely track the BRA procedures, immigration detainees 
would require court-appointed counsel in their custody hearings.331  Scholars 
already have proposed the right to court-appointed counsel for immigration 
detention matters, arguing that the due process concerns in detention are great 
enough to merit government-paid counsel for at least the detention decisions 
that are made in immigration court.332  In an empirical study of bond hearings, 
Emily Ryo found that representation by an attorney was one important factor 
that led an immigration judge to grant bond.333  It also is often overlooked 
that federal courts may appoint (and pay) counsel for indigent civil detainees; 
this is a practice that federal courts have employed in immigration habeas 
corpus petitions.334   
C. A Practical Defense 
There are also practical reasons for why this Article’s proposal would 
prove workable.  For one, taking detention decisions from immigration 
judges would allow these judges to work on the over one million cases that 
are currently pending.335  Immigration judges are critiqued for carrying out a 
 
violations by a neutral judge, and assuming for the purpose of the article that immigration judges 
provide such a neutral judge); Holper,  supra note 4, at 1283 (arguing that immigration detainees’ 
Fourth Amendment rights are regularly violated because the system provides no review by a truly 
neutral judge, since immigration judges are not truly “neutral” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 331. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
 332. See Noferi, supra note 20, at 68 (arguing for a limited right to court-appointed counsel for 
“Joseph” hearings, in which it an immigration judge determines whether the detainee is properly 
included within a mandatory detention category); see also In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 
(BIA 1999) (affirming that a mandatory detainee can seek review by an immigration judge about 
whether they are properly included in a mandatory detention category, and citing 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.19(h)(2)(ii) as the source of this authority); Cole, supra note 20, at 720–21 (arguing that the 
liberty interest is so important that the Government should provide court-appointed counsel for 
immigration detainees in custody hearings). 
 333. See Ryo, supra note 285, at 119.  The other factor was the existence of a criminal record, 
which made it less likely that a detainee would be granted bond.  Id. at 146.  Ryo suggests that—
beyond the complexity of immigration law that attorneys can navigate on behalf of detainees—
attorneys are “repeat players” who can negotiate with prosecutors ahead of time on a bond amount 
that the judge will accept.  Id. at 145.  Alternatively, the judge might see a detainee as more invested 
in the process if represented by a lawyer, or the judge could see the detainee as a “worthy opponent” 
if represented.  Id. at 145–46. 
 334. See Docket Entry No. 24, Figueroa v. McDonald, Civ. No. 18-10097-PBS (D. Mass 2018) 
(appointing pro bono counsel); Docket Entry No, 22, Doe v. Smith, Case No. 17-cv-11231-LTS (D. 
Mass 2017) (appointing pro bono counsel). 
 335. See TRAC, Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ (describing a historically high backlog of 768,257 
cases in immigration courts nationwide, to which the Attorney General added 330,211 cases that 
had been administratively closed by taking them off of the administratively closed docket). 
  
2021]TAKING LIBERTY DECISIONS AWAY FROM “IMITATION” JUDGES 1127 
 
“deportation railroad.”336  This proposal gives each judge more time to 
carefully consider the merits of each immigration case without having to 
consider bond for the detainee.  Immigration judges would be left to decide 
the issues in which they have more expertise, such as removability and relief 
from removal.337  The issues in which they have no particular expertise—
whether a person presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk—can 
be left to the magistrate judges who already make those decisions in the 
criminal pretrial detention context.338 
This proposal naturally flows from the procedural mechanisms that 
already have segregated the detention decision from the other decisions in a 
removal case.  For example, a regulation requires that bond hearings be 
separate and apart from the removal case.339  The purpose of this regulation 
is “to ensure that evidence presented in the far more informal bond hearing 
does not taint the ultimate adjudication of the charges of removability.”340  
Another regulation permits attorneys to represent clients in bond hearings; 
the same attorney need not commit to representation in the removal case.341  
The purpose of this regulation is to ensure better access to counsel for 
detainees, at least in their bond hearings, since attorneys can limit their 
representation to just bond hearings.342  
 
 336. See Remarks by Paul Wickham Schmidt to Louisiana State Bar Immigration Conference, 
New Orleans, LA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://immigrationcourtside.com/2019/04/29/read-my-speech-
to-the-louisiana-state-bar-immigration-conference-in-new-orleans-on-april-26-2019-good-
litigating-in-a-bad-system/. 
 337. See, e.g., Mosquera-Perez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 3 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 
1993) (reasoning that a court is required to give deference to the Board’s interpretation of ambiguous 
language in the INA unless the interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute” and giving deference to the Board’s interpretation of statute that barred relief from removal) 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)). 
 338. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (reasoning that in order for an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulation to receive deference, the interpretation must implicate the agency’s 
“substantive expertise,” and that “[s]ome interpretive issues may fall more naturally into a judge’s 
bailiwick”); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113, 119 (1924) (reasoning that questions of citizenship of 
the petitioner are appropriate for the district court because citizenship is “a question of frequent 
judicial inquiry,” whereas for “technical” questions regarding the public charge ground of 
inadmissibility, “[t]he [district] court is not as well qualified in such cases to consider and decide 
the issues as the immigration authorities.”). 
 339. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).  
 340. In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member, 
concurring and dissenting). 
 341. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17. 
 342. EXEC. OFF. IMMIGR. REV., DEP’T JUSTICE, Final Rule, Separate Representation for 
Custody and Bond Proceedings, to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 3 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/772051/download (“Permitting such separate appearances is 
expected to encourage more attorneys and accredited representatives to agree to represent 
individuals who would otherwise appear pro se at their custody and bond proceedings, which, in 
turn, will benefit the public by increasing the efficiency of the Immigration Courts.”). 
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There are, of course, practical drawbacks to such a proposal.  Practicing 
immigration lawyers, DHS trial attorneys, and judges all benefit from the 
efficiency of having one time slot to resolve both the custody decision and 
preliminary matters addressed at a typical master calendar hearing (taking 
pleadings and applications, scheduling future hearings, and resolving issues 
of removability).  Although the bond hearing is technically separate and apart 
from the removal hearing,343 these hearings often occur at the same time and 
typically involve the same DHS trial attorney, respondent’s attorney, and 
judge, with the only real separation being the record-keeping related to that 
hearing.344  However, the gravity of the detention decision to all parties 
involved merits special attention to that decision.  As Justice Brennan stated, 
“[t]here is no principle in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights which 
permits constitutional limitations to be dispensed with merely because they 
cannot be conveniently satisfied.”345  Also, as a practical matter, immigration 
judges may begin hearing bond decisions on different days from the master 
calendar hearing, simply because more procedures demand more of the 
court’s time.  Thus, the days where a request for bond could take place in a 
matter of minutes may be over, as more immigration detainees complain of, 
and win, a hearing where they truly have an opportunity to be heard.346  
D. Why the Present Habeas Corpus Fix Does Not Suffice 
The present system, in which federal courts review detention through 
habeas corpus petitions, has significantly improved access to bond hearings 
(for those subject to mandatory detention) and provided better procedures at 
bond hearings for many detainees.  While this system has benefited many 
immigration detainees and is the result of much hard work by Article III 
judges and litigators, it does not go far enough to remedy the systemic 
problems described in this Article.  
First, it is difficult to get in the door to federal court on a habeas corpus 
challenge.  An individual habeas corpus petition is time-consuming, and 
detainees rarely have court-appointed counsel for such a legal battle.347  Even 
 
 343. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). 
 344. Ashfaq, supra note 276, at 66. 
 345. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 346. See, e.g., Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 238–41 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(Hechavarria II) (describing a bond hearing that took place pursuant to the court’s order granting a 
prolonged mandatory detainee a bond hearing, but finding that the immigration judge had not 
applied the correct standard of proof in the hearing). 
 347. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016) (reasoning that filing a habeas 
petition from immigration detention is “complicated and time-consuming, especially for aliens who 
may not be represented by counsel”); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study 
of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (presenting results from 
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for detainees who are fortunate enough to have counsel in their deportation 
case, the attorney may choose not to spend time litigating the habeas 
challenge when the detainee faces an expedited hearing on the merits of the 
deportation case.348  Hours spent preparing a habeas petition are frequently 
wasted, as federal district courts may not reach a decision on the merits of 
the detention while the detainee is still fighting the deportation case, thus 
rendering the habeas petition moot.349  An amicus curiae brief filed in the 
Supreme Court in the Jennings case noted that, following Demore, habeas 
corpus petitions challenging prolonged mandatory detention lasted a mean 
time of nineteen months in the Eleventh Circuit, over seven-and-a-half 
months in the First Circuit, and almost fourteen months in the Seventh 
Circuit.350  An amicus brief filed in the First Circuit351 presented statistics 
 
an empirical study of 1.2 million immigration removal cases over six years, which concluded that 
detainees were five times less likely to obtain representation than nondetained respondents). 
 348. See Mary Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, CRIMMIGRATION (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:00 
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2020/01/21/the-great-writs-elusive-promise/; Mary Holper, The 
Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations, 86 U. CINN. L. REV. 923, 943 (2018).  Similarly, 
in the early days of federal immigration enforcement in the United States, few immigration detainees 
on the east coast brought habeas corpus challenges; their efforts and money were better spent on 
challenging the underlying substantive immigration case.  See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 17. 
 349. See Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, supra note 348.  For example, several habeas 
corpus cases challenging the automatic stay regulation have been dismissed as moot because the 
authority for the detention transferred before the habeas court could reach resolution of the issue.  
See supra Part I.B.  Some cases are dismissed because an appeal challenging the detainee’s custody 
is still before the Board, which has jurisdiction to consider statutory challenges and discretionary 
decisions regarding bond in an interlocutory appeal.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f).  Although exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is not statutorily required, habeas courts cite the doctrine of prudential 
exhaustion to dismiss habeas petitions where legal challenges to detention are before the Board.  
See, e.g., Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 1:16-cv-11890-RGS, Order Dismissing Case 
(D. Mass. Nov. 8, 2016). The doctrine of prudential exhaustion should not apply, however, when 
the habeas petition raises constitutional claims or the agency has predetermined the issue raised in 
the petition such that exhausting the appeal before the agency would be futile.  See, e.g., Khan v. 
Atty. Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from 
[the exhaustion requirement] because the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional 
issues.”) (alterations in original); Figueroa v. McDonald, Civ. No. 18-10097-PBS, 2018 WL 
2209217, at *3 (D. Mass. May 14, 2018) (holding that an appeal to the BIA of improper burden 
allocation would be futile because the Board already had decided the issue in a published case, and 
recognizing that the Board does not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues and therefore 
any constitutional claims need not be exhausted).  
 350. Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 31, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/10/15-1204_amicus_resp_americans_for_immigrant_justice.pdf. 
 351. In a case challenging the unlawful burden allocation that a detainee must bear in his 
immigration bond hearing, the American Immigration Lawyers Association submitted an amicus 
brief to encourage the court to reach the burden allocation argument, even though the District Court 
had not reached the issue because it decided the detainee was not prejudiced by the burden 
allocation.  Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 17-1918, Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Immigration Lawyers Association in Support of Appellant and Reversal (filed Nov. 28, 2017).  
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from the District of Massachusetts that showed it took an average of 130 days 
to resolve a habeas petition, with some averaging 408 days; this length of 
time operated to moot many petitions.352  Thus, although the current system 
contemplates a role for Article III judges, their involvement comes too late, 
or often not at all, to review the important legal questions that immigration 
detention presents.  As we see in many situations, the only successful 
litigation challenges to immigration detention are for those whose detention 
is so prolonged that the issues cannot go away.  Examples of detainees whose 
habeas petitions are less likely to become moot are those who are suffering 
indefinite detention because their countries will not repatriate them,353 and 
those who are suffering prolonged detention while they fight their cases 
(although even in these cases, the litigation strategy only has proven 
successful when courts extended the removal period to cover those who were 
fighting their cases at the circuit courts).354  Otherwise, a prolonged detention 
habeas petition becomes an invitation to the BIA to hurry up and resolve the 
issues in the removal case, thus mooting out the habeas petition.355 
Filing a habeas corpus petition puts the onus on the detainee—not the 
government—to file the necessary paperwork to put their case in front of a 
judge and to ensure that the legal arguments are properly raised and 
briefed.356  No automatic review of the legality of the detainee’s custody 
exists.357  In other civil detention contexts, courts have found that habeas 
 
 352. Ironically, one week prior to the scheduled oral argument in this case, the detention 
challenge became moot by virtue of the detainee receiving a final order of removal from the BIA.  
See Judgment, Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 17-1918 (Mar. 22, 2018).  
 353. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.678, 686, 702 (2001). 
 354. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the statute governing detention during the removal period does not begin to govern 
until a circuit court denies the petition for review and withdraws the stay of removal); Prieto-Romero 
v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that while case is on appeal to a circuit 
court, the detention is still governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the statute governing detention during 
the removal proceedings, even if the stay of removal is not yet granted by the circuit court). 
 355. AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, Five-Part Webinar Series on Habeas Corpus, AILA Doc. No. 
18031299 (June 5, 2018), https://www.aila.org/publications/videos/fearless-lawyering-videos/five-
part-webinar-series-on-habeas-corpus. 
 356. A good sample case to demonstrate the impact of how one frames the issue is Hamada v. 
Gillen, 616 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass 2009).  There,the District Court decided that the detainee was 
merely challenging the judge’s discretionary bond denial, an issue over which the court had no 
jurisdiction due to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).  Id. at 179.  However, there certainly were legal defects the 
detainee could have raised—notably, that he should not have borne the burden of proof, and that he 
had a constitutional right to be transported to state criminal court to resolve his pending criminal 
charge (which led the immigration judge to deny his bond).  See Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. 
Supp. 3d 684, 686, 691–92. 
 357. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 330–31 (recommending that even where habeas corpus is 
available, immigration detention should be reviewed in an automatic fashion, and not be left to “the 
vagaries of individual financial or practical circumstances”). 
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corpus proceedings cannot be a substitute for regular hearings that the 
government provides.358  Nor is there a mechanism in place whereby 
government officials notify pro se detainees about their right to file a habeas 
corpus petition—it is incumbent upon the detainee to figure out that such a 
writ exists, where to file it, and what to say in the petition.  The government 
has only notified members of detention class actions, and even there the 
notification is cryptic.359 
While many detainees have achieved access to better bond procedures360 
(or, in many cases, a bond hearing)361 through class actions, class actions 
present their own challenges, given the 1996 statutes that purport to bar 
injunctive relief on a classwide basis.362  While several courts have reasoned 
that classwide holdings resting on statutory interpretations did not present a 
bar to relief under the relevant statute,363 the Supreme Court in its 2018 
Jennings decision questioned this method of resolving at least one set of 
constitutional claims for a class of immigration detainees.364  The Court 
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit, requiring the court to analyze 
the detainees’ claims under the Due Process Clause, and requiring that the 
Ninth Circuit assess whether a class was the appropriate mechanism to 
 
 358. See, e.g., J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that for 
involuntary commitment of an intellectually disabled person, “[h]abeas can be at most a backstop—
a failsafe mechanism, not the sole process available.”); Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1019, 1023 
(9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that for involuntary commitment for mental health treatment, “[n]o 
matter how elaborate and accurate the habeas corpus proceedings . . . may be once undertaken, their 
protection is illusory when a large segment of the protected class cannot realistically be expected to 
set the proceedings into motion in the first place.”). 
 359. In Massachusetts, for example, two class actions challenging immigration detention in 2019 
resulted in District Court orders that permitted class members to file habeas corpus petitions.  See 
Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, supra note 348.  These class members received one 
paragraph notices that they were class members. See Notice to Reid Class Member, Reid v. Donelan, 
390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019) (on file with author); Notice to Brito Class Member, Brito v. 
Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass 2019) (on file with author). 
 360. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017); Abdi v. Nielsen, 287 
F. Supp. 3d 327, 344–45 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 271 (D. Mass 2019). 
 361. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2015); Lora v. Shanahan, 
804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), judgment vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018); 
Reid v. Donelan, 22 F. Supp. 3d 84, 88–89, 93–94 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated, Nos. 14-1270, 14-
1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018). 
 362. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity 
of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have 
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this 
subchapter [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq.], as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an 
individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”); see Jill E. Family, 
Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 82–86 (2008). 
 363. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 364. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843–51 (2018). 
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resolve the notoriously individualized due process claims.365  District courts, 
post-Jennings, are currently grappling with what, if any, relief the Due 
Process Clause should provide for classes of detainees whose mandatory 
immigration detention without a bond hearing has become prolonged.366 
Second, the current system does not allow a judge to review 
discretionary bond decisions,367 so a number of cases are outside of the 
judges’ jurisdiction.  Federal courts often have reviewed the legality of 
immigration detention decisions, notwithstanding Congress’ elimination of 
judicial review over discretionary decisions made by immigration officials 
regarding detention in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).368  Yet, Section 1226(e) requires 
courts to grapple with the thorny question of what is and is not a discretionary 
decision.  The Supreme Court recently clarified that statutes barring judicial 
review of discretionary immigration decisions do not bar review of the 
application of law to settled facts.369  However, the notion of settled facts can 
 
 365. See id. at 851–52 (reasoning that “[d]ue process is flexible” so it “calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972))).  On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that no statute bars class actions, and even if injunctive 
relief is limited, a court could still provide classwide relief as declaratory relief.  Rodriguez v. Marin, 
909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).  The court then remanded to the District Court to decide the 
constitutional issue and whether injunctive relief would be available to the class.  Id. at 257; see 
also Padilla v. ICE, 953 F.3d 1134, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated and remanded, ICE v. Padilla, 
141 S. Ct. 1041 (2021)  (discussing why the language and legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) 
do not preclude classwide relief for a class of immigration detainees seeking access to bond hearings 
and procedural protections at bond hearings). 
 366. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 227–28 (D. Mass. 2019) (denying classwide 
relief in the form of automatic bond or “reasonableness hearings” before immigration judges at six 
months of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and requiring detainees challenging 
prolonged mandatory detention to file individual habeas corpus petitions); Sajous v. Decker, No. 
18-CV-2447 (AJN), 2018 WL 2357266, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (granting a preliminary 
injunction to require a bond hearing for a class member and discussing that a motion for class 
certification for those subject to prolonged mandatory detention is pending). 
 367. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). 
 368. See, e.g., Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (reviewing 
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at a bond hearing ordered by 
the district court); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142–43 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding that 
the court has jurisdiction to enforce its prior order granting a new bond hearing where the 
government bore the burden of proof, and that the petitioner must show that either the immigration 
judge did not place the burden on the government or that “‘the evidence itself could not—as a matter 
of law—have supported’ the immigration judge’s decision to deny bond,” but that the district court 
may not review the judge’s weighing of the evidence because of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (quoting 
Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 240)). 
 369. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1071 (2020).  Scholars had been exploring for 
some years whether mixed questions of law and fact should be subject to judicial review in light of 
the various immigration statutes intended to limit judicial review of discretionary decisions in 
immigration law.  See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-
Fact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 57 (2010); Daniel 
Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the “Rule” of Immigration 
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be quite elusive when questions remain about what evidence immigration 
judges may rely upon to determine such facts.  For example, an immigration 
judge’s decision to deny bond because the detainee is a danger often rests on 
a police report from a dismissed or pending charge, or a report alleging gang 
involvement.370  How much weight the immigration judge gives such reports, 
which often include highly prejudicial hearsay,371 is exactly the type of 
question federal courts are precluded from reviewing in light of 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(e).372  In the words of Daniel Kanstroom, discretion becomes the place 
where “complicated legal questions go to die.”373 
Granting full jurisdiction to federal courts to decide custody issues is 
somewhat similar to Congress’ response after courts routinely exercised 
judicial review over immigration cases despite congressional attempts to 
restrict judicial review.  For example, Gerald Neuman has carefully outlined 
the Supreme Court’s preservation of the habeas inquiry into the lawfulness 
of exclusion and deportation orders in the face of congressional efforts 
between 1891 and 1917 to confer finality upon those orders.374  Congress 
responded by accepting the reality—federal courts would continue to review 
deportation and exclusion orders—and writing such review into the 
 
Law, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 166–72 (2006); Kanstroom, supra note 274, at 710–11; Gerald 
L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2006). 
 370. See, e.g., Rubio-Suarez v. Hodgson, No. 20-10491-PBS, 2020 WL 1905326, *2–*3 (D. 
Mass. Apr. 17, 2020) (rejecting the detainee’s argument that police reports for pending cases cannot 
prove dangerousness as a matter of law if the detainee did not object to the report during the bond 
hearing); Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d. at 143 (reviewing an immigration judge’s decision to deny 
bond because the government presented evidence that the detainee was a gang member, which led 
the judge to find that the detainee was a danger).  
 371. See, e.g., Laila Hlass, The School to Deportation Pipeline, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 752–
53 (2018) (discussing highly unreliable hearsay contained in gang verification reports on which 
immigration judges rely); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 675, 675, 693–700 (2015) (discussing highly unreliable hearsay contained in police 
reports on which immigration judges routinely rely). 
 372. See, e.g., Hachicho v. McAleenan, No. EDCV 19-820-VAP (KK), 2019 WL 5483414, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2019); Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 772–73 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(holding that a district court “has jurisdiction to review [an] IJ’s discretionary bond denial” where 
the denial “is challenged as legally erroneous or unconstitutional,” but courts “must be careful not 
to encroach upon ‘the IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence’” (quoting Kharis v. Sessions, 
No. 18-cv-04800-JST, 2018 WL 5809432, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018)). 
 373. See KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 240.  A good example of this is the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Carcamo v. DOJ, in which a noncitizen disputed the contents of the police report, and 
the court wrote that “‘talismanic invocation of the language of due process’ is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction on this Court” because “[d]ue process does not require that the IJ credit Carcamo’s 
testimony over the evidence contained in the criminal complaint.” 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 374. See Neuman, supra note 43, at 989, 1007–17. 
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immigration statute.375  Courts similarly responded to the 1996 efforts to 
eliminate judicial review over several types of immigration decisions by 
maintaining jurisdiction over questions of law and constitutional questions.376  
Congress again relented, amending the immigration statute to provide for 
review of such questions through petitions for review in the circuit courts.377  
Statutory codification of judicial intervention in immigration detention 
cases also has historical precedent.  For example, the earliest courts dealing 
with those who could not be deported frequently held that indefinite detention 
was unconstitutional.378  Congress responded in 1952 by legislating a judicial 
role, granting the statutory right for a detainee to file a habeas corpus petition 
in federal court upon a showing that the immigration authorities were not 
acting with “reasonable dispatch” to either reach a deportation order or 
effectuate that order.379 
Third, some district courts have discussed the inefficiencies of sending 
a case back to the immigration judge once the district court has decided a 
habeas corpus petition.380  These cases came earlier in the challenges to 
prolonged mandatory detention following the Demore decision,381 when 
courts were still trying to sort out the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision.  
Once bond hearings for those suffering prolonged mandatory detentions 
 
 375. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651–53 (repealed 1996).  
Kanstroom has described the 1961 reforms as “eliminat[ing] an entire layer of court review” that 
habeas corpus review had previously provided.  KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 185; see also 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1624 (2000) (“Congress thought that the combination of district 
court review of the agency action and court of appeals review of the district court decision was 
slower and more cumbersome than a one-stop review process in the court of appeals.”). 
 376. See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297–314 (2001) 
(interpreting one provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”) and three provisions of IIRIRA as not barring habeas corpus jurisdiction questions of 
law and constitutional questions); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 197–98 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(interpreting sections of the Foreign Affairs Reform Restructuring Act, AEDPA, and IIRIRA as not 
barring habeas corpus jurisdiction over questions of law and constitutional questions). 
 377. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (May 11, 
2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which prohibits judicial review of most discretionary decisions 
in removal cases, although courts may review constitutional questions and questions of law); see 
also KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 326 (referring to this provision as “a response to the St. Cyr 
case”). 
 378. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 33–34 (citing Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F.2d 13, 16 (9th 
Cir. 1931); U.S. ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401, 403–04 (2d Cir. 1922)).  
 379. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), (c) (1952). 
 380. See, e.g., Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 464 (D. Mass. 2010); Alli v. 
Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541–42 (M.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d in part and vacated in part by Alli v. 
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
 381. Following Demore, several detainees challenged whether mandatory detention as applied 
to their cases, where detention was prolonged, violated their Due Process rights.  See, e.g., Sopo v. 
Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). 
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became a regular occurrence, courts may have been less willing to shoulder 
the burden of so many bond hearings.  Also, for the class actions that 
succeeded in obtaining bond hearings once mandatory detention reached six 
months, the remedy sought by class counsel was a bond hearing in 
immigration court,382 so this effectively ended the practice of district court 
judges holding their own bond hearings.  However, there are still detainees 
who bring their cases back to a district court after an unsuccessful bond 
hearing that the district court ordered, effectively putting the custody issue 
into federal court receivership.383  The inefficiencies noted by earlier district 
courts might serve as a reminder to federal courts today: If you want 
something done correctly, you have to do it yourself.384  The unworkability 
of a case-by-case habeas approach is one reason why at least one federal 
circuit court, deciding whether detainees whose mandatory detention under 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) had become unreasonably prolonged, suggested that 
Congress or the executive branch establish a set of procedures for either 
federal courts or immigration judges to follow.385  
 
 382. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 22 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93–94 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated, Reid v. 
Donelan, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018); Lora v. 
Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), judgment vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 
1260 (2018) (upholding relief that required bond hearings before immigration court once mandatory 
detention exceeded six months); Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d and 
remanded by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (upholding relief that required bond 
hearings before immigration court once mandatory detention exceeded six months). 
 383. See, e.g., Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (reviewing 
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond hearing ordered by 
the district court); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d. 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019) (reviewing 
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond hearing ordered by 
the district court); Enoh v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-85(LJV), 2017 WL 2080278, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. May 
15, 2017) (reviewing whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond 
hearing ordered by the district court). 
 384. Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 
1685–86 (2007) (“[I]mmigration courts often must spend additional resources to revisit decisions 
that have been overturned by appellate courts, and the appellate court opinions themselves can be 
quite embarrassing to the agency (as many of Judge Posner’s are).”). 
 385. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 502 n.5 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Given the shortcomings of 
case-by-case habeas review identified above, however, it would be appropriate for the executive (or 
the legislature, as the case may be) to consider explicitly permitting detainees in the position of the 
petitioner to seek a reasonableness review before a federal court or before an immigration judge 
more familiar with the intricacies of the case and the particulars of the underlying removal 
proceedings.”).  On remand, the District Court in Reid v. Donelan allowed plaintiff class members 
to amend the complaint to propose the alternative relief of a “reasonableness hearing before an 
immigration judge” once mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) has become prolonged.  
Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125-PBS, 2018 WL 5269992, at *4, *8 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2018).  The 
District Court ultimately did not grant this relief and held that detainees suffering prolonged 
mandatory detention must file individual habeas corpus petitions.  Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 
3d 201, 227–28 (D. Mass. 2019). 
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Finally, while it is possible for habeas courts to continue to use their 
equitable powers to hold their own bond hearings, this may not be the most 
optimal long-term solution.  Because it is not a legislative fix, it lacks the 
necessary funds to support such an effort.  It would be a shame if judges 
deciding habeas corpus petitions and exercising equitable jurisdiction to hold 
bond hearings found themselves in the same “habeas corpus mill” that 
occurred in the late 1800s in San Francisco, drowning under the number of 
immigration detainee cases to hear without adequate resources to help.386  
Judges who wish to guard the American ideal of physical liberty for 
immigration detainees should receive resources to adequately address their 
caseloads.  Also, Congress should more honestly look at how it allocates 
money for immigration enforcement and adjudication.387  Congress should 
move money away from the private prison industry that currently warehouses 
immigration detainees388 and into a system that provides real adjudication of 
each detainee’s right to liberty.  Congress has unofficially passed the buck to 
the judiciary to police immigration detention;389 it is time to put detention 
decisions squarely into the hands of federal courts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Breyer, in his 2001 majority opinion in Zadvydas, cautioned 
against immigration detention where “the sole procedural protections 
available to the alien are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien 
bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without (in the 
Government’s view) significant later judicial review.”390  He wrote, “the 
Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an administrative body the 
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental 
 
 386. See Fritz, supra note 158; SALYER, supra note 158, at 21 (discussing San Francisco federal 
judge petitioning to Congress in January 1888 to pass more restrictive legislation, acting “primarily 
out of their despair over their crushing caseload” in Chinese Exclusion Act cases). 
 387. See Sean McElwee, It’s Time to Abolish ICE: A Mass-Deportation Strike Force is 
Incompatible with Democracy and Human Rights, NATION MAG. (March 9, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/its-time-to-abolish-ice/. 
 388. See, e.g., Claire Hansen, Biden’s Order Aiming to End Use of Private Prisons Excludes 
Immigrant Detention Facilities, U.S. News (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/national-news/articles/2021-01-26/bidens-order-aiming-to-end-use-of-private-prisons-
excludes-immigrant-detention-facilities; ALEINIKOFF & KERWIN, supra note 9, at 13 (proposing 
that the Biden administration end the use of private corporations to administer immigration 
detention centers); Gilman & Romero, supra note 10; see also Brownell, supra note 160, at 3 
(discussing the DOJ’s policy of reducing detention and closing detention facilities, which “has 
incidentally resulted in a considerable financial saving to the Government.”).  
 389. See Cox, supra note 384, at 1686 (“If federal courts are dedicating additional resources to 
police the immigration courts, Congress might conclude that it is not worth investing its own energy 
to restructure that system of adjudication.”). 
 390. 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001). 
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rights.’”391  The Zadvydas Court considered indefinite immigration detention 
of those who could not be deported.  Yet Justice Breyer’s instructive words 
echoed those of Justice Black in 1952, who  considered release on 
immigration bond during deportation proceedings.392  
These opinions are a half-century apart yet represent an equally 
cautionary tale, telling Congress that an immigration detention system 
wherein administrative officers make key decisions about the right to liberty 
is unacceptable in the United States.  It matters not whether Congress calls 
the administrative decisionmaker a judge; in the immigration context, that 
judge works for the nation’s top prosecutor and can easily be removed for 
ruling against the government.  Immigration judges’ independence has long 
been under threat.  The Trump administration took advantage of the systemic 
flaws to break down any vestiges of immigration judges’ independence.  
Congress therefore should prevent imitation judges from wielding the 
extraordinary governmental power to take away physical liberty. 
 
 391. Id. (citing Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 
(1985); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder certain 
circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”). 
 392. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I think that 
condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary in accordance with procedural ‘due process of 
law.’  To farm out this responsibility to the police and prosecuting attorneys is a judicial abdication 
in which I will have no part.”). 
